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Recent historical work has raised the intriguing possibility that the Framers meant to 
accomplish only one goal in the Fourth Amendment: to forbid general warrants.  On this 
historical account, the first clause stating a right of the people to be Afree from unreasonable 
searches and seizures@ is merely declaratory of the principle that led the Framers to ban general 
warrants.  Rephrased to be true to this history, the Fourth Amendment would say: AThe right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against general warrants shall 
not be violated, and no general warrants shall issue.@  As no general warrants have issued in the 
last two centuries, limiting the current Fourth Amendment to its historical roots would deprive it 
of any effect.  When constructing Fourth Amendment doctrine, the Supreme Court has thus been 
faced with language that is hopelessly vague and with history that is of no help.  The result is a 
Fourth Amendment without coherence.  But what if the Framers could have seen modern 
policing?  Given the values that underlie the Fourth Amendment, how would the Framers have 
written it with the modern context in mind?  This article transposes the Framers to the turn of the 
twenty-first century and then asks them to return to the eighteenth century and rewrite the Fourth 
Amendment.  The result is an Amendment that would produce a doctrine that is both clearer and 
more elegant than the Court=s haphazard Fourth Amendment.
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Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Fourth Amendment:
If James Madison Could Have Seen The Future
Imagine it is August 17, 1789 and we are walking on the dirt streets of New York City 
toward the Federal Hall.  Constructed over five years beginning in 1699, Federal Hall was chosen 
by the New York City Council to house the new federal government.1  Congress commissioned 
Pierre L=Enfant to convert the building into Aan elegant meeting place for Congress.@2  When 
completed, the three story building measured 95 feet in width and 145 feet at its deepest point.3
A handsome building in the Federal style (naturally), its main entrance was on Wall Street off a 
covered walk that paralleled the street.4  From the plainly appointed hall just inside the entrance, 
we enter Athe central three-story vestibule, which ha[s] a marble floor and an ornamented skylight 
under a cupola.  Off this vestibule [stands] the House of Representatives chamber, a two-story 
richly decorated octagonal room.@5
In this room, the House is debating the Bill of Rights.  When the Tenth Amendment (now 
1
 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, vol. IX, 1789-91.
2




 For a drawing of the Federal Hall, courtesy of the New York Historical Society, see 
http://www.gwu.edu/~ffcp/exhibit/p3/index.html.
5
 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 3 n.1.  The Federal Hall was torn down in 1812.  
Id.
4the Fourth) is read to the body, Eldridge Gerry rises to say that his smallpox inoculation6 has 
given him such a high fever that he glimpsed what appeared to be the future.  In two hundred 
years we have federal officers who are always seeking to uncover criminal activity.  Mr. Gerry 
said it looked to him just like the British customs officials in the years before the Revolution.  
But the federal officers have developed miraculous devices that Gerry cannot understand as he 
struggles to describe them to his fellow legislators.  For one, federal officers use hovercrafts that 
suspend themselves over the homes of citizens, allowing the officers to see through cracks in the 
roofs or observe anything outside the house.  After hovering over one home for a time, they can 
move to the next.  And the next.  And the next.  Mr. Gerry asks Madison whether the Fourth 
Amendment would forbid this conduct.
Before Madison could answer, Mr. Gerry tells of another vision of the future.  In this one, 
the federal officers are given the task of catching smugglers.  Because many smugglers avoid 
interdiction at the borders, the officers seek to find them inside the country by targeting certain
highways and other modes of transportation for close observation.  These heavily armed officers 
are authorized to stop vehicles traveling on particular roads near the border.  They are also 
broadly authorized to stop vehicles anywhere in the country and seek consent from the drivers to 
search the vehicles.  And they are authorized to approach individuals who are on trains and buses 
6
 Inoculation against smallpox had been practiced in America since the early eighteenth 
century.  John and Abigail Adams and their children were inoculated.  David McCullough, John 
Adams 142 (2001).  According to McCullough, A[t]he idea had come from a slave belonging to 
Cotton Mather, an African named Onesimus, who said the practice was long established in 
Africa . . . .@  Id.  A small incision was made in the healthy patient and then >pus from the ripe 
pustules= of a smallpox patient@ was scooped Ainto the open cut.  A generally mild case of 
smallpox would result, yet the risk of death was relatively slight.@  Id.  
5(yes, he would have to explain to the Framers what trains and buses are) and ask them for 
identification.  While blocking the aisle in a bus or train, the officers ask to search the persons 
and belongings of the passengers, all without any suspicion that anyone is guilty of smuggling.  If 
the person acquiesces in the request from the officers, his belongings can be ransacked and any 
evidence found can be used to convict him of one of thousands of federal crimes.  Yes, Mr. Gerry 
informs the shocked audience, in 2002 the federal criminal code will contain roughly 3,500 
criminal offenses and another 10,000 or so criminal prohibitions can be found in federal 
regulations.7  Thirteen thousand federal crimes, compared to the roughly two dozen created by 
the First Congress!!8
The final vision of Mr. Gerry=s fever-deranged mind is of a similar force, this time under 
the authority of a State and named Apolice.@  The idea of state or city police is an alien concept 
that he must explain.  Then he would describe what New York City looks like in 2004, and the 
room falls silent.  These state and city police, he tells the audience, are looking for suspicious 
conduct of any nature, not just related to various smuggling enterprises.  When they see 
suspicious conduct, they can seize the individual and frisk him for weapons, without probable 
cause to think that he is committing a crime.9  Possessing a weapon violates several state laws 
and if the police officer finds a weapon, the State can use it to convict the suspect of one or more 
of these crimes.  Leaving aside the issue of what happened to the Second Amendment, Mr. 
7
 Paul Rosenzweig, Congress Clogs Courts with too Many Federal Crimes, July 24, 2002, 
http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed072402.cfm
8
 2 Stat., ch. 8, sect. 1 - sect. 23 (1790).
9
 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), explicitly rejected probable cause as the proper 
standing for making a Astop and frisk,@ instead finding Areasonable suspicion@ to be sufficient.
6Madison, would the Fourth Amendment permit these acts of the state militia?
What would Madison answer?
Madison might, of course, tell Mr. Gerry to go home, get some rest, and recover from his 
smallpox inoculation.  Madison might reject the horrific nightmare of national and state militias 
that do not exist to protect citizens from foreign enemies but, rather, to insinuate themselves into 
our homes, our travel, and our cities.  It can never happen, Madison might say, so long as we 
have a republican form of government.  The citizens will always keep the dreaded central 
government, and the state governments, in check. 
But Gerry tells Madison that what the Framers could not anticipate was that by the 
twentieth century, the citizens fear criminals more than they fear the government.  For the most 
part, citizens welcome the war on drugs, the presence of heavily-armed police in the cities, and 
the fight against organized crime and terrorism.   The check on the government, at all levels, in 
the area of search and seizure had largely disappeared by the middle of the twentieth century.
Madison might wonder what happened to the common law, some of which was enacted 
into federal law as early as 1789, that required individualized suspicion and placed other 
limitations on the power of the customs officials to rummage at will through our belongings.10
Customs officials had to have individualized suspicion even to search ships docked in our 
harbors.  So what happened?
10
 See 1 Stat., ch.5, sect. 24 (1789), discussed at note 42 and accompanying text.
7Those of us alive in 2004 know that Gerry=s fever dream was accurate.11  And there is 
more.  Imagine a typical day.  (We will, of course, have much to explain to Madison about the 
conveniences of modern life.)  We will assume that the police have no solid evidence against 
you, nothing that would approach probable cause for a search warrant or for an arrest.  Perhaps 
they have heard a rumor or perhaps have targeted you because of your friends or associates or 
because of your race or ethnicity.  Here is what your world could look like if your only protection 
against these militia-like police was the Fourth Amendment.12
I. Search and Seizure: 2004 Model
You call your office while eating breakfast.  The police can record the number you dial.13
 You access the weather on your computer.  The police can record what web sites you visit and 
11
 See, e.g., Drayton v. United States, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (upholding bus sweep in 
which the police obtained Aconsent@ as described in the second of Mr. Gerry=s nightmares in the 
text); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (permitting police to ask a motorist for consent to 
search even after the traffic ticket is issued and thus the justification for the stop has ended); 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (permitting police to stop a vehicle for a trivial 
traffic violation even if the traffic stop is a pretext for an unarticulated suspicion that would not 
permit a stop); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (approving visual surveillance from a 
helicopter hovering 400 feet over defendant=s greenhouse); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 
(upholding seizure and frisk of person for weapons on reasonable suspicion to believe that crime 
was afoot and the suspect was armed).
12
 I consider in this paper only the limitations placed on police conduct by the Fourth 
Amendment.  Congress and the states have in a few cases placed more stringent restrictions on 
police than the Court has found in the Fourth Amendment.
13
 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
8how long you stay.14  You drive to the news stand where you buy a cup of coffee.  Undercover 
police have installed a beeper in a false bottom of the cup.15  They can use this beeper to follow 
you on your sales route today.16  If you stop by the home of a drug dealer or a lover, the police 
will know that.  When you arrive at work, the numbers you dial on the phone there, too, can be 
recorded.  At any time during the day, or night, the police can come to your work or your home 
and ask for permission to search.17  When you look over your canceled checks for your business 
or home, you should know that the police can examine those in the hands of your bank.18  If you 
decide to throw away old canceled checks (or letters from a lover or gambling slips from your 
bookie), you should know that the police can rummage through your garbage when it is sitting on 
your property.19
If you drive home to avoid being cornered on a bus or train, you can be stopped at a 
roadblock for the police to inspect your driver=s license and car registration or to talk to you to 
see if you are intoxicated.20  If you live near the border with Mexico, you can be stopped at a 
14
 This follows by necessary implication from Smith, supra note 13.
15
 This is not a Fourth Amendment seizure.  See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 
(1984).
16
 This is not a search.  See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
17
 See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
18
 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
19
 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
20
 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (vehicle inspection checkpoints) (dicta); 
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoints).
9fixed roadblock by the immigration authorities.21  When you get home, you may be surprised to 
discover that the authorities have used a backhoe to dig up your entire two acre backyard (they 
were careful not to dig up your shrubs or the area adjacent to your house).22  Whatever they find 
in this excavation can be used to prosecute you.  At any time, police can Aplant@ an undercover 
agent in your business or pleasure activities to spy on you and report back what you said and 
did.23  They can Awire@ this person so that the police can listen and record what you say.24  The 
police can do all the things in this and the last paragraph, plus the hovercraft and the bus 
encounter, without the slightest shred of suspicion.  
21
 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
22
 This might be a stretch of Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), depending on 
which of the Court=s two rationales is the principal one.  The first justification for approving an 
entry onto and examination of a farm was that the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to 
open fields.  On that reasoning, there is no reason to believe that what is under the surface of the 
fields is protected.  But the Court also concluded that a property owner would not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his fields.  That reasoning might create Fourth Amendment 
protection if the Court was willing to hold that one can reasonably expect privacy in what one 
buries in an open field.
23
 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
24
 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality).
10
What say you, now, Mr. Madison?  
The Fourth Amendment was, in one sense, too successful.  Written to ensure that 
Congress could not authorize general searches, the second clause of the Amendment is so clear 
and categorical that the Court only once has had to deploy the Amendment to strike down an Act 
of Congress and even there the Court had to enlist the Fifth Amendment right against compelled 
self-incrimination to justify its holding.25  The first clause is, however, phrased at a high level of 
abstraction, identifying a Aright of the people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizes@ and specifying that it Ashall not be violated.@ One 
question left from the history of the Fourth Amendment is whether the Framers wanted that 
clause to have independent significance and, if so, what it would prohibit.  One possibility, 
endorsed by Professor Thomas Davies after a careful review of the relevant history, is that the 
first clause is merely declaratory of the right that underlies the requirements in the Warrant 
Clause.26
For decades, the Court read the Fourth Amendment as if the only real issue was whether 
the police had to have a warrant.  This methodology transferred meaning about what searches and 
seizures are Areasonable@ into a question about the need for a warrant.  This is consistent with the 
notion that the real Fourth Amendment requirement is in the Warrant Clause and we merely need 
25
 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (striking down an Act of Congress that 
construed the refusal to provide documents as demanded by the government as an admission of 
the allegations in the demand). 
26
 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547 
(1999).
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to identify the class of searches to which that Clause applies.  If the police needed a warrant, and 
did not have one, the conduct was unreasonable.  If they did not need a warrant, the police 
conduct was automatically reasonable.  
During this time, the Court began with the cardinal principle that a warrant-less search of 
a home is unconstitutional.  The Court sought to build a warrant requirement using this principle 
as the base of a logical pyramid.  So, for example, if police had to have a warrant to search a 
house, what about a car parked in a driveway?27  What about a footlocker that was placed into the 
trunk of a car moments before the suspects were arrested?28  What about a box discovered during 
the search of a car?29  That methodology worked pretty well, but in the late 1960s, the Warren 
Court (yes, the Warren Court) began to favor a more nuanced approach that relegated the warrant 
Arequirement@ to a subcategory of cases and found meaning in the Reasonableness Clause to 
cover a large expanse of police conduct.  What the Court failed to appreciate is that outside the 
warrant requirement no rules existed to decide when a search was reasonable.  What developed 
was a balancing test with the public interest in admitting reliable evidence of guilt on one side 
and the suspect=s privacy on the other.  Even the least cynical reader will appreciate that this kind 
of balance will almost always come out in favor of a narrow Fourth Amendment.  And it has.  
The Warren Court expanded greatly the scope of Fourth Amendment protection but the depth of 
27
 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 445 (1971) (holding that a warrant was 
required).
28
 Chadwick v. United States, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that a warrant was required).
29
 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality) (warrant required).
12
protection began to shrink even on the watch of the Warren Court30 and more so in the hands of 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.31
30
 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting a Astop and frisk@ without 
probable cause); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (overruling Gouled v. United States, 
255 U.S. 298 (1921), to permit police to search for any kind of evidence, not just contraband).
31
 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (permitting police to search a car Aincident to 
arrest@ even though the arrestees were no longer in the car).
Here, I seek a simplified, reformulated vision of the Fourth Amendment.  The method of 
inquiry will be to understand the common law relevant to search and seizure and the political 
context in which the Amendment was proposed and debated.  Against this background, I will 
propose a series of modifications based on what I think the Framers would have said if they 
could see particular modern police methods.  Of course, my conclusions are tentative and open to 
refutation.  Nonetheless, I believe some fairly solid Aproof@ comes of this exercise.  Despite the 
impossibility of putting ourselves truly into the mind of men who lived 220 years ago, I believe 
we can recover enough of the context and politics of that time to create a Fourth Amendment 
more consistent with the principles that led to its creation.  
My Anew@ Fourth Amendment contains eight clauses rather than two, but my proposed 
reforms can be grouped under three heads.  First, the Court=s attempt to expand the coverage of 
the Fourth Amendment by restating it as protecting privacy is a failure.  We need to return to the 
13
plain meaning of Apersons, houses, papers, and effects@ as those items would be understood by 
the Framers in the context of modern life.  Second, the most important requirement for searches 
and seizures in colonial times was individualized suspicion.  The modern Court has read 
individualized suspicion out of the Fourth Amendment in a variety of ways and those doctrines 
should be abandoned.  Third, as a corollary of the second principle, consent should never be 
permitted to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.  In the context of justifications for a search, my new 
Fourth Amendment is elegant: police may search or seize when they have probable cause.  If they 
do not have probable cause, they may not search or seize.
First, I briefly describe and Alocate@ my methodology in the scholarly field.
II. A Word on Methodology
History has probably been used (and misused) more frequently in seeking to understand 
the Fourth Amendment than all other criminal procedure rights combined.  Reasons for the 
extensive use of history here include the unknowable Aedges@ of a right against Aunreasonable 
searches and seizures,@ the flagrant abuses of the British in using writs of assistance to attempt to 
enforce increasingly unpopular customs laws, and the general resentment of British power that 
manifested itself during this period.  The Supreme Court uses history when convenient, dipping 
its toe into the waters here and there to support a decision that the Court has surely made on other 
grounds.  Some scholars use the same methodology, engaging in what Morgan Cloud calls
Alawyer=s histories.@32  These histories, on Cloud=s account, Ahave been partial in two ways: they 
32
 Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History, Searching For History, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
14
have been incomplete, reviewing only a small fraction of the relevant historical data, and they 
have been partisan, selectively deploying fragments of the historical record to support their 
arguments about the Amendment's meaning.@33
But a more fundamental problem attends Fourth Amendment history, as Tom Davies 
shows most clearly.  Almost nothing about the Framers= Fourth Amendment is relevant to 
modern policing.  Those who seek to build a current doctrine on a foundation of history must 
shape the history in awkward if not downright perverse ways to make it fit.  It is as if one were 
trying to make a jet fighter from oak timbers.
The approach most faithful to conventional historical methodology is to set out the 
history as accurately as possible without regard to what it means to today=s doctrine.  This is the 
Adamn the torpedoes@ method, most effectively used by Professor Tom Davies.34 William 
Cuddihy essentially uses the same methodology though he ultimately makes an argument that the 
Framers preferred specific warrants.35  While this is probably true, it does not solve the central 
mystery that almost every Fourth Amendment scholar has ignored.  If specific warrants were the 
constitutionally preferred method of searching, why did the Framers fail to tell us when warrants 
are required?  The Fourth Amendment sets out with great detail what search warrants must 
1707, 1707 (1996).
33
 Id. at 1708.
34
 Davies, supra note 26. 
35
  William John Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602-
1791 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School).
15
contain and says nothing about when warrants must be used.  For decades the Court tried to fill 
this vacuum, spasmodically and without a clear pattern, as I will describe later.  Today, however, 
the Court has given up the game and lacks any coherent schema for what constitutes an 
Aunreasonable search and seizure.@
After setting out the most exhaustive history to date of the Fourth Amendment, Davies 
describes the conundrum faced by serious historians: AThat the original meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment sounds so strange to modern ears demonstrates the degree and depth of change that 
has occurred in constitutional search and seizure doctrine since the framing.@36  Ultimately, 
Davies is Askeptical . . . whether even clear history can provide much positive guidance for 
shaping specific responses to modern search and seizure issues.@37  This is because A[i]n a very 
real sense, the modern mystery associated with the two-clause text of the Fourth Amendment is 
the product of the Framers' inability to gauge how criminal justice institutions would actually 
evolve.@38  Thus, A[a]pplying the original meaning of the language of the Fourth Amendment in a 
completely changed social and institutional context would subvert the purpose the Framers had in 
mind when they adopted the text.@39
I agree with Davies that even the clearest history of how the Framers meant the Fourth 
Amendment to operate would be essentially meaningless in today=s constitutional world.  I seek, 
36
 Id. at 724.
37
 Id. at 736.
38
 Id. at 741.
39
 Id. at 740-41.
16
instead, to offer the piece of the puzzle that is missing in our Fourth Amendment universe.  How 
would the Framers have written the Fourth Amendment if they could have foreseen modern 
police methods?  To accomplish this goal, the reader must be grounded in the pre-Framing era 
and the values held by the Framers.  This is the task of Part III.  In Part IV, I will write the Fourth 
Amendment that I think the Framers would have written if they could have seen the future.  In 
Part V, I will briefly describe the Court=s alternative vision of the Fourth Amendment.  Part VI 
asks the reader to choose which one seems better.
III. Alfred E. Neuman40 in 1789: What Me Worry About Searches?
The historical record is clear: the experience with British rule left the Framers terrified of 
general searches.  General searches on land were typically conducted pursuant to writs of 
assistance.  From roughly the middle of the seventeenth century until the Revolution, writs of 
assistance had been understood to authorize British customs officers Ato enter and inspect all 
houses without any warrant.@41  But the Framers also feared general searches of ships for dutiable 
items.  While the record is less clear on this point, Davies argues that ships were sui generis and 
not covered by the Fourth Amendment.42
40
 A reader of an early draft worried that some readers would not know Alfred E. 
Neuman.  I was tempted to say Aso be it@ but caution prevailed.  He is the Aposter child@ for Mad 
Magazine and his motto in the face of sure disaster is Awhat me worry@?
41
 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 759.  Cuddihy concludes that this understanding violated 
both local law and British law.  Id.
42
 Davies, supra note 26, at 603-608.  One additional piece of evidence in favor of 
Davies=s position is that the Framers abolished general searches of ships about two months before 
debating the Fourth Amendment.  The first federal statute regulating customs searches required 
17
The correct resolution of the ship issue is not germane to my project because whether 
ships were included or not, the Framers sought to abolish general warrants.  And that is all the 
Framers sought to do in the Fourth Amendment.  I will offer a short proof of the proposition that 
the Fourth Amendment was aimed only at general warrants.  Then I will ask why the Framers did 
not concern themselves with other types of searches and seizures.  This discussion leads, I 
believe, to the conclusion that had the Framers seen the future, they would have written a 
different Fourth Amendment.  If I am right on this point, I am open to attack from originalists.  
To conclude that the Framers wrote the wrong Fourth Amendment might move the originalist to 
say that the people should amend the Constitution to get the right Fourth Amendment; otherwise 
the Fourth Amendment condemns general warrants and that=s all.  To satisfy the originalist, I can 
perhaps claim that these nascent rights are in the Ninth Amendment and the Fourteenth.  Thus, 
technically, what follows might be an argument for finding a right against unreasonable searches 
and seizures in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.  But those kinds of distinctions are less 
important to me than getting the right in question defined properly, and I will situate the 
argument in the Fourth Amendment.  Indeed, if compelled to choose between originalism and a 
modern reading of the Fourth Amendment consistent with the Framers= values, I choose the 
latter.
  The Fourth Amendment has detailed requirements to ensure that warrants are specific 
rather than general: Ano Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
customs officers to have Areason to suspect any goods or merchandise subject to duty shall be 
concealed@ before they could enter any ship or vessel@ to search. 1 Stat., ch.5, sect. 24 (1789). 
The Framers obviously knew of the problem of suspicion-less searches of ships and how hard 
would it have been to include Aships@ in the first clause of the Amendment?
18
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.@  The first clause contains a vague observation that the Aright of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated.@43  Thomas Davies has concluded that Aunreasonable@ meant something quite 
different to the Framers than it does to us today.  Today, it has a relativistic meaning -- roughly, 
conduct that is inappropriate in the particular circumstances.44  One may act reasonably, under 
tort law, by driving 80 miles an hour to get a badly injured person to the hospital but not by 
driving 80 miles an hour on icy roads for the thrill of it.  
The Framers, according to Davies, understood the term in a much more formal way.  Lord 
Coke used it as a synonym for Aunconstitutional.@  In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
ATo say that a statute was >against reason= was to say that it violated basic principles of legality.@45
 When James Otis argued against the writs of assistance in 1761, he cited, and probably quoted, 
an opinion by Lord Coke that used Aagainst reason@ to mean Aso contrary to the principles of 
common law as to be >void.=@46 John Adams was in the audience that day and his notes of Otis=s 
speech include the citation to the Lord Coke opinion.47  Adams wrote the Massachusetts 
constitutional provision condemning unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Framers of the 
43
 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
44
 Davies, supra note 26, at 686.
45 Id. at 688.
46
 Id. at 690.  Davies concludes that Otis would have read Coke=s Aagainst reason@




Fourth Amendment drew from Adams=s provision.  ABecause >unreasonable= was a pejorative 
synonym for gross illegality or unconstitutionality, . . . the Framers would have understood 
>unreasonable searches and seizures= as the pejorative label for searches or arrests made under 
that most illegal pretense of authority -- general warrants.@48
Further evidence supporting Davies=s reading of history is that the only right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures created in state constitutions or charters prior to the drafting 
of the Fourth Amendment was the right not to have a general warrant issued.49  An example is 
the Massachusetts provision that John Adams wrote: 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures 
of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, 
therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not 
previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a 
civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more 
suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special 
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant 
ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities, prescribed by the laws.50
The Atherefore@ that connects the general condemnation of unreasonable searches and seizures to 
48
 Id. at 693.
49
  Neil H. Cogan, ed., The Complete Bill of Rights 234-35 (1997).
50
 Massachusetts Constitution, XIV (1780).
20
the specific limitation on warrants makes plain that the John Adams had in mind only general 
warrants in the first sentence.
The focus on general warrants can be seen in Madison=s original formulation of the 
Amendment: that the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
Ashall not be violated by warrants issuing without probable cause . . . .@51  This locution can only 
be read, I think, to create a right against general warrants rather than a broader right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  To be sure, Madison=s locution was changed to the form we 
have today, with two independent clauses joined by Aand,@ and ratified in that form.  But the 
evidence we have suggests that the change was intended to make the ban on general warrants 
stronger, rather than to create a free-standing protection in the first clause.
Mr. Benson made the motion to change the wording to the current form.  His argument 
was that Aby warrants issued@ was not a Asufficient@ ban against general warrants.52  He Atherefore 
proposed to alter it so as to read >and no warrant shall issue.=@53 ANo warrant shall issue@ is a 
stronger locution than Athe right . . . shall not be violated by warrants issued@ and there is no 
reason to think that uncoupling of the clauses did anything more than strengthen the prohibition 
against general warrants.
The other evidence that the Framers worried only about general searches comes from the 
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debates in the state conventions and from the pamphlets and newspapers of the era.  In giving an 
example of the deficiencies of the new government, Patrick Henry said on June 24, 1788, that 
many Avaluable things are omitted” -- for example:
general warrants, by which an officer may search suspected places, without 
evidence of the commission of a fact, or seize any person without evidence of his 
crime, ought to be prohibited.  As these are admitted, any man may be seized, any 
property may be taken, in the most arbitrary manner without evidence or reason.  
Every thing the most sacred may be searched and ransacked by the strong hand of 
power.  We have infinitely more reason to dread general warrants here than they 
have in England, because there, if a person be confined, liberty may be quickly 
obtained by the writ of habeas corpus.54
Henry had earlier held up the Virginia Bill of Rights as a model.  Again, he described 
only the right against general warrants when discussing Athose indefeasible rights which ought 
ever to be held sacred!@  A fuller quote follows:
In the present [Virginia] Constitution, they are restrained from issuing general 
warrants to search suspected places, or seize persons not named, without evidence 
of the commission of a fact, etc.  There was certainly some celestial influence 
governing those who deliberated on that Constitution; for they have, with the most 
54
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the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, 
588 (1847) (June 24, 1788).
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cautious and enlightened circumspection, guarded those indefeasible rights which 
ought ever to be held sacred!  The officers of Congress may come upon you now, 
fortified with all the terrors of paramount federal authority.  Excisemen may come 
in multitudes; for the limitation of their numbers no man knows.  They may,
unless the general government be restrained by a bill of rights, or some similar 
restriction, go into cellars and rooms, and search, ransack, and measure every 
thing you eat, drink, and wear.55
Among other inferences one can draw from the above quote, Patrick Henry=s distaste for federal 
customs agents is almost palpable!
The Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer on October 5, 1787 described the rights afforded 
under the state constitution (called here a Aframe of government@) as a model for what should be 
included in the Bill of Rights.
Your present frame of government, secures you to hold yourselves, houses, papers 
and possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants granted 
without oaths or affirmations first made, affording sufficient foundation for them, 
whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search your 
house or seize your persons or property, not particularly described in such 
warrant, shall not be granted. . . .  How long those rights will appertain to you, you 
yourselves are called upon to say, whether your houses shall continue to be your 
55
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castles; whether your papers, your persons, and your property, are to be held 
sacred and free from general warrants, you are now to determine.56
While there are clearly values being protected here that transcend guaranteeing specific warrants
-- for example, requiring a Asufficient foundation@ to allow authorities to search and seize -- it is 
equally clear that the writer had only general warrants in mind as the evil to be forbidden.  
56
 Id. at 239, quoting 13 John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J Saladino, eds. The Documentary 
History of the Ratification of the Constitution 328-29 (1981-1995).
Rephrased in modern style the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment is: AThe right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against general warrants 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.@  So we search history in vain for a meaning of Aunreasonable@ that extends beyond the 
condemnation of general warrants.
But why would that be the exclusive focus of men who were very suspicious of the new 
central government?  Why not have a more general protection of privacy?  The answer here is 
that, like all of us, the Framers were a product of their times.  No general limitation on 
warrantless searches would be needed because the nature of crime and policing did not produce 
much in the way of searches without warrants.  
24
The Framers would not have known the Apolice@ that we have today.  AConstables were 
expected to preserve order by keeping an eye on taverns, controlling drunks, apprehending 
vagrants, and responding to >affrays= (fights) and other disturbancesCbut they were not otherwise 
expected to investigate crime.@57  To supplement the constables, most cities employed the 
nightwatch.  Designed to disrupt ongoing crimes and prevent crimes about to happen, the 
nightwatches in New York City, for example, were sometimes composed entirely of civilians 
forced either to take their regular turn or pay for a substitute to replace them.  At other times, 
especially during wars, the militia took over the watch.  At still other times, a paid constables=
watch was used or citizens themselves were paid to guard the city.58  “ANight watchmen did not 
have police powers and could arrest with impunity only if a crime were committed before their 
eyes or if they were acting under the direction of a police officer.”59
Obviously, a para-military operation designed to keep the streets safe at night is a world 
removed from pro-active policing designed to solve crimes that are already complete.  What was 
the colonial approach to this problem?  The answer was that for the most part citizens initiated 
criminal prosecutions.  Putting to one side homicides60 and the crimes that threatened the social 
or economic order -- for example, riot, treason, and counterfeiting -- Athe initiation of arrests and 
searches commenced when a crime victim either raised the >hue and cry= or made a sworn 
57




 James Richardson, The New York Police, Colonial Times to 1901, at 18.  Richardson 
uses Apolice officer@ interchangeably with Apeace officer,@ by which he means marshals and 
constables.
60
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note 26, at 622.
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complaint.@61  The difference between these approaches to completed crimes and modern 
policing, as I shall explain, is that colonial crime-solving would not be helped by warrantless 
searches other than the search incident to arrest, and there is considerable doubt about the extent 
to which searches incident to arrest occurred routinely.62
The hue and cry was an ancient common law process that obligated anyone who knew of 
a felony to raise the hue and cry Awith horn and with voice@ to put the village on notice of the 
felony.63  Then Athey that keep the town@ (all able bodied men) shall follow Afrom town to town, 
and from county to county@ until the felon Abe taken and delivered to the sheriff.@64  The hue and 
cry dates back to Edward I (around 1300) and evolved over the centuries into a more elaborate 
process.  A statute during Elizabeth=s reign required that it be conducted Awith both horsemen 
and footmen.@65  A later statute made a village liable to a fine (to being Aamerced according to the 
law of Alfred@) upon a constable or Alike officer refusing or neglecting to make hue and cry.@66
In the eighteenth century, the “hue and cry” was Athe major instrument of police 
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advantage to the hue and cry is that Aconstables and his attendants@ had Athe same powers, 
protection, and indemnification, as if acting under the warrant of a justice of the peace.@68  So 
warrantless arrests could be made, based on probable cause, and searches incident to arrest, 
perhaps, but constables had no incentive to make any other kind of warrantless search.  A 
variation on hue and cry was the search for escaped prisoners, which could be authorized without 
a warrant.  For example, on December 30, 1776, the Continental Congress requested Baltimore 
county Ato direct immediate and strict search for the prisoners, who last night escaped from the 
gaol in Baltimore.@69
By the eighteenth century, the justice of the peace could issue a hue and cry warrant,70
apparently for cases where fresh pursuit was no longer possible. An early example (1716-17) is a 
New York hue and cry warrant presented by a mother for the murder of her bastard child.71
Between 1767 and 1775, Asix typical Virginia warrants ordered peace officers to search diligently 
for a horse thief, fugitive servants and slaves, a counterfeiter, a murderer, and a jailbreaker.@72
The records in New York indicate that the hue and cry warrant was not used very often,73 but the 
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Aancient practice of [warrantless] actual hot pursuit persisted.@74
The closest to modern police officers were the constables and marshals.  They Ahad the 
common law duties and powers@ of peace officers.75  Only they could legally execute arrest 
warrants, and they Ahad more latitude that the private citizen in making an arrest without a 
warrant.@76  Private citizens Acould be sued by an innocent man even if [the citizen] had acted on 
reasonable grounds and in good faith; a peace or police officer could be sued by an innocent man 
only if the officer acted frivolously or with deliberate intent to oppress.@77  Moreover, unlike the 
night watchmen, whose duty was to keep the peace, constables and marshals were charged with 
being Avigilant in detecting and bringing to justice all Murderers, Robbers, Thieves and other 
Criminals.@78
The Framers would have endorsed constables, marshals, and citizens searching for 
robbers, thieves, and escaped prisoners.  To be sure, the hue and cry warrant had some of the 
attributes of general warrants in that the authorities could search wherever the felon might be 
hiding, though the treatises of the time Afrequently advised against forcible entry unless the 
suspect was inside.@79  But a general search for a horse thief, a murderer, or a jail breaker was 
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 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 1143.
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designed to protect public safety, and the threat to privacy was considered more justifiable.  
Moreover, a search for a particular individual, general though it may be in some senses, is not 
nearly as destructive of privacy as the writs of assistance that authorized inspection of any house 
or truly general warrants instructing officers to look not for particular felons but more generally 
to suppress particular crimes.80  Most importantly, the hue and cry arrest was either on hot pursuit 
or pursuant to a warrant.  The Framers would not have thought this practice to be threatening to 
privacy and would not have intended to regulate it in the Fourth Amendment.  Why regulate a 
process that is proceeding in an acceptable manner?
The other way a citizen could initiate the criminal process in the eighteenth century was 
by filing a complaint with a local justice of the peace.  The justice of the peace could issue arrest 
and search warrants, to be served by the constable or marshal.81  These warrants were typically 
(though not always) specific in nature.  When they authorized the constable or marshal to arrest a 
particular individual or search a particular place, the Framers would not have objected.82  When 
the warrants were general in nature, the Warrant Clause took care of that problem.
And what of the crimes that threatened government -- riot, treason, and counterfeiting?  
The prosecution of these crimes was by government rather than citizens.  Riot was not a crime 
that would have required a search to obtain evidence of guilt.  Evidence of treason might be 
80
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found by warrant, but treason prosecutions were rare in colonial America,83 and no evidence 
exists of colonial era warrants in treason cases.  Counterfeiting was of course precisely the kind 
of crime for which a search warrant would be highly useful.  And it appears that they were used 
at least to some extent in colonial America.  AWarrants, orders, and executive proclamations in 
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina . . . told enforcers to >make Search= or to 
>make diligent Search= to suppress counterfeiting, arson, and insurrection.@84  A 1764 Connecticut 
warrant ordered A>diligent Search in all places= where the informant and the New Haven County 
Sheriff suspected that counterfeit coins or the machinery for manufacturing them might be 
found.@85  But the prohibition against general warrants in the Fourth Amendment took care of the 
problems presented by these warrants and orders. 
As long as the constable had a specific warrant to search or arrest, the Framers would not 
have objected.  As long as an arrest was made by the hue and cry in hot pursuit, the Framers 
would not have cared.  What of the problem of peace officers making arrests outside the hue and 
cry and without a warrant?  Many have noted that the common law created a major disincentive 
to making arrests without a warrant.  Until 1783, Athe officer arrested without a warrant at his 
peril because if a felony had, in fact, not been committed, he would be liable to the arrested 
person@ regardless of the quantum of evidence that supported the arrest.86  In England, the King=s 
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Bench changed the rule in 1783 to provide that the officer was not liable in damages if he made a 
warrantless arrest on a Areasonable and probable ground of suspicion.@87  The strict liability rule 
continued for night watchmen and citizens who made arrests pursuant to the hue and cry.  While 
it is not clear when the change in the rule about officers first appeared in the United States, no 
evidence of it exists prior to an 1829 New York case that approves the change.88  The experience 
of the constable or marshal, and the view of the Framers, would not likely have been changed by 
the new rule from Britain.  In 1783, we were not taking many lessons from Britain. Thus, the 
Framers would have assumed that the tort law effectively deterred warrantless arrests unless 
pursuant to the hue and cry.89
But a much larger disincentive to illegal arrests existed than the one created by the 
common law tort liability.  What has escaped the attention of most legal historiographies to date 
is the political and personal risks that constables ran when serving warrants.  At least in 
eighteenth century New York, the social fabric was frayed and sometimes close to tearing.  Law 
was often not enforced because the State lacked the force or the will to confront lawbreakers.  
Constables were often Aassaulted and resisted when they attempted to make an arrest.@90  Over 
70% of the seventeenth century cases of contempt of authority collected by one researcher 
Ainvolved attacks by citizens on officers of the law.@91  Though Ait is difficult to explain the 
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frequency of these attacks on law enforcement,@ likely reasons include that the constabulary was 
largely drawn from artisans and tradesmen, with no training in being a peace officer, and Athat 
respect for authority of government seems often to have been lacking.@92  The most intriguing 
reason is offered by historian Douglas Greenberg: the existence of a Acommon Error generally 
prevailing among the Lower Classes of Mankind in this part of the world that after warning the 
Officer to desist and bidding him to stand off at his Peril, it was lawful to oppose him by any 
means to prevent the arrest. . . .@93  Peace officers who faced angry suspects willing to oppose the 
arrest by any means could not have been eager to make many arrests.  
This reluctance to make arrests suggests that officers would have also been reluctant to 
search incident to arrest, at least beyond what was necessary to disarm the suspect.  Cuddihy 
suggests that colonial peace officers routinely searched the person, effects, and even the mouth of 
the suspect.94  But he cites no cases for the proposition and there is no way to know whether the 
newspaper accounts and correspondence describe a routine practice or something so out of the 
ordinary as to merit mention.  It seems to me that officers who are afraid to arrest would want to 
keep their hands out of the mouth of the arrestee!
Part of the problem faced by constables and sheriffs is that they lacked the force to 
overcome resistance.  When the Attorney General of New York was faced in 1765 with mobs of 




 Id. at 267-68 (quoting from the pardon given by the governor of the colony of New 
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simply too difficult to arrest 200 men -- or even ten.  Indeed, it was dangerous enough to 
apprehend just one offender.  New York society in the eighteenth century simply lacked the 
resources to resist such disorder.@95  In addition, New York was unable to fill constable, sheriff, 
and other criminal justice positions with qualified men.  AFor example, two prisoners who had 
been sentenced to hang on January 18, 1762 were reprieved until February 19 because >the sheriff 
cannot find any person to act as hangman.@96  The prisoners were hung only when Aa party of the 
Majesty=s Forces@ was called out Ato guard the Sheriff and Civil Officers against any Insult.@97
It is difficult for us in the twenty-first century to appreciate this kind of social disorder.  
As we have seen, outside the context of general warrants and writs of assistance, the Framers 
would have had no conception of aggressive policing.  They simply had no template in their head 
for officers of the law seeking to gather evidence of crime, or even aggressively to arrest ordinary 
criminals.   To the extent the New York experience can be generalized,98 the Framers would 
likely have wished for more aggressive policing, not less, as long as it was done by local (not 
federal) officers and was directed at robbers and thieves.
95
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 Historians suggest that New York was more lawless than most other colonies because 
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of its Aextraordinarily volatile@ society and politics.  Greenberg, supra note 67, at 280. 
When writing the Fourth Amendment, the Framers would not have worried about the 
arrests and searches for evidence of Aordinary@ crime.  What they did think about were the 
searches and seizures that the British had used to enforce the increasingly-unpopular customs 
laws.  This history suggests that the search-related evil that the Framers would have perceived 
was the general search.  Reading the Fourth Amendment with this history in mind makes it plain 
that an unreasonable search was a general search and an unreasonable seizure was a seizure 
pursuant to a general warrant. 
The Framers took care of that problem with the Warrant Clause.  If we had asked them, 
AWhat else does the Fourth Amendment protect against?@ they would not have understood the 
question.  But on the reasonably safe bet the Framers would have created protection against some 
types of aggressive modern policing if they could have seen the future, we can examine the 
context of the passage of the Fourth Amendment and some of the remarks made by the anti-
Federalists.  Here, I will seek answers to some of the questions I posed in the beginning.
IV.  What Alfred E. Neuman Should Have Been Worrying About in 1789
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In 1789, the anti-Federalists intended to keep the central government from using general 
warrants to pursue and punish its enemies.  Given that aggressive policing in the modern style 
was unknown to the Framers, they could not have had any intent about the appropriate balance 
between aggressive policing and the right to be Asecure in [our] persons, houses, papers, and 
effects from unreasonable searches and seizures.@  To get some idea how the Framers might have 
reacted had they known the kind of policing that would evolve over time, we can examine the 
debate about the need for the Fourth Amendment and the contemporaneous congressional 
statutes.  One strand of their attitude can be discerned from remarks made at the Virginia state 
convention considering ratification of the Constitution.  George Mason on June 11, 1788 made 
anti-tax remarks in the Virginia ratifying convention that included the following prediction about 
excise taxes: Athis will carry the exciseman to every farmers house, who distills a little brandy, 
where he may search and ransack as he pleases.@99
Patrick Henry amplified on the concern about the excisemen when he spoke of a 
Agovernment of force@ that the Constitution might create.  Congress may declare war, and Athe 
President shall command the regular troops, militia, and navy.@100  Part of Henry=s concern about 
a Agovernment of force@ was with the power to search.  ASuppose an exciseman will demand 
leave to enter your cellar, or house, by virtue of his office; perhaps he may call on the militia to 
enable him to go.@101  On another occasion, Henry warned of federal sheriffs who may Aruin you 
by impunity@ by Asucking your blood by speculations, commissions, and fees.@ AThus, thousands 
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of people will be most shamefully robbed.@102  In the same speech, he said the federal 
Constitution Asquints toward monarchy@ with a president who Amay easily become king@ and a 
senate where Ayour dearest rights may be sacrificed by what may be a small minority@ that may 
Acontinue forever unchangeablely [sic] this government, though horridly defective.@103
The Henry-Mason concern is the power to search Aby virtue of office@ backed by the 
power of the president and the federal army.  A second concern appears, quite clearly, in a statute 
Congress passed before it acted on the proposed Bill of Rights.  In a statute designed both to give 
power to and to restrain the dreaded Aexcisemen,@ Congress gave customs officers the Afull power 
and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods or 
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed.@104  The same section provided that with Acause 
to suspect a concealment thereof, in any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other such 
place,@ the customs officers were Aentitled to a warrant to enter such house, store, or other place 
(in the daytime only) and there to search for such goods.@105  In sum, the Framers envisioned 
searches requiring in all cases a Areason to suspect@ or Acause to suspect,@ and when the cause 
focused on structures on land, a warrant was required.  Moreover, the common law requirement 
that a home could be searched only during the daytime was included in the statute.
Four principles emerge from this history.  First, the Framers feared that government 
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actors would abuse their office to force compliance with searches.  Second, the Framers believed 
that searches required individualized cause or suspicion.  Third, searches of structures required a 
warrant.  Fourth, the Framers embraced at least some of the common lawCfor example, the 
daytime requirement for searches of structures.
If these principles are fairly deduced from the Fourth Amendment history, then we can 
write the Fourth Amendment that the Framers would have written if they had known that the 
future problem with searches would not be general searches but, rather, countless warrantless 
searches sanctioned by a twentieth century Court that had no coherent theory of the Amendment. 
Here is my effort at that Anew@ Fourth Amendment:
[1] The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated [2] by 
Warrants issuing without probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized; [3] other than searches incident to arrest, no search shall be conducted on 
less than probable cause to believe that the search will produce evidence of crime; 
[4] search warrants are required only for searches of a structure or of the inside of 
the human body; [5] searches of structures shall be conducted in the daytime and 
pursuant to notice to occupants; and [6] no arrests or other seizure of the person 
shall be made on less than probable cause, [7] warrants are required for all arrests 
in the home unless the arrest is made in hot pursuit or to protect life or property; 
and [8] all arrests permit the arresting officer to search the arrestee and the area of 
his immediate control. 
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Clauses [1] and [2]106 are the Fourth Amendment that Madison proposed.  Though the 
risk of Congress or a state authorizing general warrants is pretty low, no reason suggests ignoring 
the risk.  Moreover, the specific requirements for warrants in clause [2] provide helpful guidance 
to courts in evaluating warrants.  Clause [3] has a single requirement that addresses the first two 
concerns manifest in the history of the Fourth Amendment.  By requiring probable cause to make 
a search, the harm of suspicion-less searches is avoided, and the risk that officials will abuse their 
power to cause compliance by coercion or trickery is minimal.  If the officer has probable cause 
to search, then he need not force acquiescence to his authority.  He has the right to make the 
search.  I exempted searches incident to arrest from this requirement because, even though the 
evidence is far scarcer than the Supreme Court would have us believe, there is some evidence 
that colonial law recognized the right to make this kind of search for protection of the arresting 
officer and to find evidence.107
Clause [4] is roughly the Court=s current warrant requirement and is consistent with the 
common law that the Framers knew.  I assume that the interior of the body is equally as private 
as inside a structure.  Unlike the Fourth Amendment that Madison wrote, this clause makes clear 
that warrants are not required for searches outside the house, an area of the law that has been in 
flux for the last 25 years.  
106
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Clause [5] contains a daytime and notice requirement for execution of warrants to search 
structures.  These are the least important rights in my Anew@ Fourth Amendment.  But the notice 
requirement was well established at common law, and the First Congress saw fit to include the 
daytime requirement in the first customs search law.  Both seem salutary and unlikely to create 
many problems for courts, though the question of how much notice to give, in terms of time, is 
from self-defining.108
Clause [6] embodies the common law that probable cause is needed to arrest.  I added Aor 
other seizure of the person@ to make clear that the Amendment should apply to more than formal 
arrests.  I could find no evidence either way as to whether temporary seizures as part of the 
nightwatch were permissible at common law.  But as I shall argue shortly, I am convinced that 
the common law would not have permitted the kind of temporary stop the Court permits under 
Madison=s Fourth Amendment in Terry v. Ohio.109  Deciding what constitutes a Aseizure of the 
person@ is not, of course, easy, but the Court=s definition in Terry makes good sense: Awhenever a 
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has >seized= the 
person.@110
Clause [7] is based on the Court=s reading of history and the resulting doctrine.111  History 
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is less than clear that warrants were required for arrests in the home,112 but the Court=s doctrine 
makes good sense even if history is a bit opaque.  Clause [8] embraces the search incident to 
arrest doctrine, despite, again, a lack of solid historical evidence.  History aside, the policy 
considerations are so strong here -- especially protecting the arresting officer -- that any 
interpretation of a limitation on searches simply must include this exception.  
From here, my plan is to show how my reconstructed Fourth Amendment compares with 
what the Court has done.  First I will defend my reconstructed Fourth Amendment in more detail.
112
 In a rare serious treatment of history by the Court, the Payton majority and dissent 
engage each other in a thoughtful and well-researched discussion of this point.
V. Arguments for a Reconstructed Fourth Amendment
I shall proceed in a different order than the clauses are listed in my reconstructed Fourth 
Amendment.  It makes sense to dispose of the three clauses that do not involve complicated 
issues before proceeding to the ones that are both complicated and contentious.
A.  Clause [4]:  Search warrants are required only for searches of a structure or of the 
interior of the human body.
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Colonial search warrants were sometimes broader than a search of a structureCfor 
example, a warrant commanding the constable to Adiligently search every suspected House and 
place within your Parish@113Cyet it is difficult to imagine what would be searched other than a 
structure, a ship, an open space, or a person.  Whatever the common law, the language of the 
Amendment (Apersons, houses, papers, and effects@) seems to exclude ships and open spaces.  
That leaves structures and persons.  The search of persons incident to arrest is covered by Clause 
[8].  All other searches of persons are covered by Clause [3], which requires probable cause but 
no warrant.  As to the nature of structures, I intend to cover all structuresCbarns, outbuilding, and 
commercial premises as well as houses.  Davies concludes that the Framers would have 
envisioned much less protection for commercial premises than for homes.114  That may be right, 
though the first customs law made a point to include as protected places Ahouse, store, or other 
place.@  Moreover, Cuddihy noted the existence of several pre-Framing state statutes that 
protected warehouses, storehouses, barns, and out-houses along with houses.115  As Cuddihy puts 
it, AThe sanctity of the American house was spreading to the outbuildings and to the things that 
they contained.@116  This seems sufficient evidence to use the word Astructure@ in place of Ahome@
in clause [4].  
Additional evidence that warrants were required for searches of structures can be found in 
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the actions of the Continental Congress.  At the height of the Revolutionary War, the Continental 
Congress recommended to the various States that they make it a crime to harbor deserters. Part of 
the recommended law was to fine Aany commissioned officer, constable, or other person@ who 
Ashall break open any dwelling House, or outhouse under pretense to search for deserters, without 
warrant from a Justice of the Peace . . . if no deserter shall be found therein.@117  To be sure, this 
is a weak form of a warrant requirement as it does not apply unless the searcher was mistaken 
about the presence of deserters but it nonetheless shows that warrants were important when 
officers sought to justify entry into homes or even outbuildings.  
117
 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 at 117 (Thursday, February 13, 
1777).
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If Cuddihy is right, colonial officers sometimes searched the mouth of the arrestee.118  But 
the Framers would not likely have thought of other body cavity searches or the extraction of 
blood for analysis.  Nonetheless, as the Court has suggested, if a warrant is required for the 
search of a house, the Fourth Amendment should require at least that much to search under the 
skin of a person:  
Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and, absent an 
emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are 
concerned . . . .   The importance of informed, detached and deliberate 
determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another's body in search of 
evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.119
The search warrant requirement here is a robust version of the Court=s current warrant 
requirement.  The Court held in 1925 that a search warrant was required to search a home120 and 
it has repeated that statement of the core Fourth Amendment protection in many cases.121  My 
formulation is a robust version of the Court=s rule because it lacks any exception.  All searches of 
structures must be by warrant. No exception exists for exigent circumstances because, as just 
noted, any exigency can be thoroughly mitigated through the exigent exception for warrant-less 
118
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119
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arrests in the home.
More controversially, there is no exception for consent.  Consent is offered to justify 
searches of homes and of persons and vehicles.  My reconstructed Fourth Amendment rejects 
consent as a justification for a search.  Because consent comes up much more frequently as a 
justification to search persons or vehicles than homes, I defer defending its elimination until I 
discuss the clause [3] requirement of probable cause.  The same justifications that undergird the 
argument in the clause [3] context apply to the warrant requirement here. 
B. Clause [5]: searches of structures shall be conducted in the daytime and pursuant to 
notice to occupants.  
The daytime requirement comes from the first federal customs law and makes good sense. 
 If an emergency justifies entry into a home in the nightime, clause [5] permits an entry to make 
an arrest, assuming probable cause.  If the suspect is arrested, police can secure the premises 
(nothing in my reconstructed Amendment would forbid this) and make a thorough search the 
next day with a warrant.122  Thus, no reason suggests itself to permit entry into a home at night 
merely to make a search that could be made during the day.
122
 The Court agrees that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to search after the 
exigency has ceased.  See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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The notice requirement is solidly embedded in the common law.  It appears in a 1603 
case that refers to it as already part of the common law when it appeared in a statute in 1275!123
Whether it goes back before 1275, it was well established in the eighteenth century.  The Court 
cites several framing era sources.  William Hawkins, one of the most influential commentators in 
the years leading up to the Bill of Rights, stated the rule clearly and noted no exceptions 
although, to be sure, his rule was limited to making arrests inside a structure.124  But the 1603 
case articulated the rule to include Aother execution of the K[ing]=s process.@125  And it makes no 
sense to require notice to make an arrest inside a structure and not require notice for a thorough 
search of the premises, so we should read Hawkins to include the execution of search warrants:
And now I am to consider in what Cases it is lawful to break open Doors 
to apprehend Offenders; and to this Purpose I shall premise, That the Law doth 
never allow of such Extremities but in Cases of Necessity; and therefore, That no 
one can justify the Breaking open another=s Doors to make an Arrest, unless he 
first signify to those in the House the cause of his Coming and request them to 
give him Admittance.126
As Davies first noted, the framing-era sources articulating the notice rule 
do not admit of exceptions, though the Court has conveniently read the Fourth 
123
 Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 932 n.2 (1995).
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Amendment Areasonableness@ requirement in the first clause Anot to mandate a 
rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement 
interests.@127   Of course there are policy grounds in favor of permitting courts to 
craft exceptions when giving notice would expose the officers to danger or, 
perhaps, when notice would permit destruction of evidence.  But Clause [1] 
relates only to searches and if we are really trying to write the Fourth Amendment 
the Framers would have written had they seen the future, I doubt that they would 
have wanted courts ignoring the notice requirement just to make it easier for the
customs officers to find evidence inside a man=s home.  So I will go with history 
here and permit no exceptions to protect against destruction of evidence.
The only other issue posed by this clause is how long must the officer wait for an answer 
to the notice before he can force entry.  Read literally, Hawkins would seem to require that the 
officer must wait for an answer, however long it takes.  He wrote: ABut where a person 
authorized to arrest another who is sheltered in a House, is denied quietly to enter it, in Order to 
take him; it seems generally to be agreed, That he may justify Breaking open the Doors in the 
following Instances . . . .@128  But to require the officer to wait until an answer is given seems an 
unjustified reading of Hawkins.  On the other hand, the Court has not required very much, 
127
 Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934-35 (1995).  Davies concludes that this 
exception was Aa departure from historical doctrine.@  Davies, supra note 26, at 742, n.561.  The 
cases that the Court cites fail to establish any general rule of reasonableness from the common 
law.
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holding that a 15 to 20 second wait can satisfy the Fourth Amendment.129  That level of detail is 
beyond the scope of my current project.
C. Clause [8]: all arrests permit the arresting officer to search the arrestee and the area 
of his immediate control. 
Despite the Court=s oft-repeated assurance that this mode of search has been Aalways 
recognized under English and American law,@130 support for that proposition is surprisingly hard 
to find.131  Davies cites a single source, an essay by a former high constable of Middlesex 
England that advises constables that Aa thorough search of the [arrested] felon is of the utmost 
consequence to your own safety, and . . . by this means he will be deprived of instruments of 
mischief, and evidence may probably be found on him sufficient to convict him.@132  Davies then 
129
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(Ireland C. C. 1887); 7 Am. Crim. Rep. 66.  The problem is that Dillon is the only case cited (the 
Court cites two different reports of Dillon); it is an Irish case, not English or American; it is from 
the late nineteenth century not the eighteenth; and the Irish court rejects the incident to arrest 
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noted that Athe doctrine of search incident to arrest is not uniformly accorded importance in the 
framing-era materials; for example, there is no mention of that doctrine in@ a Virginia Justice of 
the Peace manual published around the time of the Framing.133
Cuddihy concludes, AAnyone arrested [in the colonial era] could expect that not only his 
surface clothing but his body, luggage, and saddlebags would be searched and, perhaps, his 
shoes, socks, and mouth as well.@134  But the only authorities he cites for this proposition, and 
there are many of them, are letters, memoranda, depositions, and newspaper accounts.  Does the 
existence of this documentary record show that these searches were routine or, rather, that they 
were noteworthy enough to be recorded?  In a later part of his dissertation, Cuddihy notes that 
Anumerous legal manuals@ from the time of the framing recognized the practice of searching 
someone who has been arrested by warrant after the officer has forced entry.135  Still later in his 
dissertation, Cuddihy concedes that these treatises stand only for the proposition that Aofficials 
could force open doors to serve arrest warrants, not [that] they could search after achieving 
entrance or how far.@136  Perhaps the narrow proposition can be generalized to the broad one he 
makes earlier.  Perhaps the broader principle was so well accepted that it was simply not raised in 
cases or mentioned in the treatises.  Perhaps.
133
 Id. (referring to William Waller Hening, New Virginia Justice, entered for publication 
in 1794).
134
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Of course, the policy reasons supporting this type of search are overwhelming.  
Moreover, it is not true that to permit this kind of search ignores the probable cause requirement. 
 There must be probable cause to make the arrest, after all.  Moreover, rare will be the arrest 
based on probable cause that does not automatically give rise to probable cause to search the 
person and area of control of the arrestee.137  The arrest of all felons would likely give rise to 
probable cause to search for weapons.  The arrest for any drug offense would surely create 
probable cause to search for drugs.  Rather than litigate this issue in every case, why not have a 
bright line rule permitting what sound policy suggests?
D. The right . . . shall not be violated by [2] Warrants issuing without probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.
This clause has been a resounding success.  Cuddihy=s exhaustive search of treatises and 
legal manuals from 1792-1820 turned up A[o]nly a few general search warrants in this literature, 
all commanding their bearers >to make diligent search= for a fugitive.@138  The Supreme Court has 
never decided a case involving a general warrant. A few cases raise the issue of whether the 
description is particular enough.  So, for example, the Court had to decide whether a description 
of the suspect=s premises as the Athird floor apartment@ was sufficiently particular when it turned 
137
 That rare case does exist.  Indeed, the case where the Court made clear the automatic 
nature of the right to search incident to arrest is such a case.  In Robinson v. United States, 414 
U.S. 218 (1973), the defendant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle after revocation of his 
operator=s permit.
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out, unbeknownst to the police when they secured the warrant, that the third floor contained two 
apartments.139  The Court upheld the warrant because the record disclosed no basis to conclude 
that the officers knew, or should have known, that the third floor contained two apartments.
But the problem the Framers sought to remedy were the writs of assistance and general 
warrants.  Even worse than general warrants, writs of assistance were used by British customs 
officials to enter and inspect any house.  Examples of general warrants that we saw earlier were a 
warrant Ato suppress counterfeiting, arson, and insurrection@ and a warrant to search A>in all 
places= where the informant and the Sheriff suspected that counterfeit coins or the machinery for 
manufacturing them might be found.@140  Compared to the writs of assistance or these warrants, 
the problems of particularly the Court has had to police are pretty trivial.  
Only two cases manifest a failure of the formal requirements of the Warrant Clause and 
neither violates the Aletter@ of the Warrant Clause.  In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,141 a peculiar 
New Hampshire statute permitted prosecutors and police to be justices of the peace and thus
permitted them to issue warrants.  Testimony at Coolidge=s trial was that the police never went 
outside the police department or the prosecutor=s office to get warrants issued.  In Coolidge=s 
case, despite the notorious nature of the brutal rape and murder of a child, the State Attorney 
General issued the warrant to search Coolidge=s home and car.  Nothing in the Fourth 
Amendment says explicitly that warrants have to be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, 
139
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but one does not have to strain too hard to see that requirement as implicit: ABut it is too plain for 
extensive discussion that this now abandoned New Hampshire method of issuing 'search 
warrants' violated a fundamental premise of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments@Cthat 
the magistrate who issues the warrant must be Aneutral and detached.@142
The other failure involved the odd case of Lo-Ji Sales v. New York.143  The Town Justice 
viewed two films that an investigator had purchased from the local Aadult@ bookstore and 
determined them to be obscene.  The Town Justice issued a warrant Aauthorizing the search@ of 
defendant=s store Aand the seizure of other copies of the two files exhibited to the Town 
Justice.@144  So far, so good.  But the affidavit also asserted that Asimilar@ items could be found in 
the adult book store, items that affiant believed Awere possessed in violation of the obscenity 
laws.@145  Perhaps this passes muster, too, though the obvious difficulty is the vagueness of the 
notion of Asimilar@ items.  How can a member of the state police make that legal determination?  
Presumably to finesse this problem, the warrant application asked the Town Justice to 
accompany the investigator to the store when the warrant was executed.  The affidavit authorized 
the seizure of "[t]he following items that the Court independently [on examination] has 
determined to be possessed in violation of Article 235 of the Penal Law,@ with no items listed at 
the time the Town Justice signed the warrant.146  What the Court called a Asearch party@ of eleven 
142
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investigators, including the Town Justice and three members of the local prosecutor=s office, 
Aconverged on the bookstore.@
After the Town Justice=s inspection of the various items for sale, the warrant affidavit 
grew to 16 pages, and the state police seized 23 films, 4 coin-operated projectors, 397 magazines, 
and 431 reels of film.147  In a unanimous, and not very illuminating, opinion, the Court held the 
warrant unconstitutional.  Sniffing that it was Areminiscent of the general warrant or writ of 
assistance,@ the Court found a failure of the particularity requirement.  But except for the 
involvement of the Town Justice at the scene of the search, it is not clear what was wrong with 
the procedure.  Imagine that the investigator purchased one each of the items seized and took 
each to the Town Justice, who added the names of the films and magazines to the affidavit.  
There is no particularity problem here.  The only difference is that the Town Justice was on the 
scene in the actual case.  But why should this matter?  The Court offers no explanation.  But the 
case is a clear reminder that the fear of the general warrant lives on.
Moving beyond form, the Warrant Clause has caused the Court one problem with 
substance: how does one define Aprobable cause@ so that the magistrate=s issuance of the warrant 
can be evaluated on its substance.  The probable cause issue has been difficult for the Court, but 
the Framers would not likely have cared much about the fine distinctions drawn in the cases.  For 
the common law, the significant distinction was between suspicion-less searches or arrests and 
those founded on individual suspicion, without regard to the level of suspicion or, indeed, even 
the source of the suspicion.  Blackstone stated that a justice of the peace could issue a warrant 
147
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based on suspicion of the party praying for the warrant because the justice Ais a competent judge 
of the probability offered to him of such suspicion.@148  Blackstone cautioned that the party 
praying the warrant (whom we call the Aaffiant@) should Aexamine upon oath the party requiring a 
warrant, as well to ascertain that there is a felony or other crime actually committed.@149   There is 
an assumption here, of course, that the peace officer would fairly consider whether a crime had 
been committed, but it is not a flawed assumption, even by today=s standards.  Police would not 
want to seek evidence of a crime that has not in fact occurred.  But once the peace officer thought 
a crime had been committed, Blackstone was willing to defer to the justice=s determination of 
probability of suspicion directed at a particular person to be arrested or place to be searched.
The Aancient common law rule@ was that a peace officer was permitted to arrest Afor a 
felony not committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.@150
Blackstone used the term Aprobable suspicion@ for making a warrant-less arrest.151  A 1722 
handbook for justices of the peace, published in Philadelphia, included a sample warrant for a 
search of Aevery suspected House and place@ in search of stolen goods.152  While the standard for 
Asuspected@ is not given in that warrant, the sample warrant to search for a felon recites that the 
affiant has Agreat cause to suspect@ a particular suspect.153  A sample warrant in a 1754 handbook 
148
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authorized a warrant based on a robbery victim=s allegation of Ajust Cause to suspect@ that the 
house contained his property.154   These handbooks, separated by three decades, show an 
evolution in the direction of requiring particularized suspicion.
The common law did not invest much significance in the quantum or quality of the 
suspicion because the arrested individual would be brought before a justice of the peace, who is 
Abound immediately to examine the circumstances of the crime alleged.@155 AIf upon this enquiry 
it manifestly appears, either that no such crime was committed, or that the suspicion entertained 
of the prisoner was wholly groundless, in such cases only it is lawful totally to discharge him.@156
 Thus, mistakes made at the arrest stage could be quickly corrected.  Nor were the Framers likely 
concerned about the mistaken search that did not lead to seizure of goods or an arrest.  Whether 
the Supreme Court was right in Illinois v. Gates157 to reject the so-called Aguilar-Spinelli two-
pronged test for measuring probable cause would likely have struck the Framers as much ado 
about nothing (indeed, it might strike modern readers that way too!).  It is clear that what counted 
for Blackstone and for the Framers was that a justice of the peace inquire into the grounds for 
suspicion and issue or not issue the warrant.  The precise nature of Aprobable cause@ could be 
safely left to justices of the peace.158
154
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Moreover, although this was a departure from Blackstone=s view of the common law, 
many warrants Aissued reflexively on complaint@ in the colonies in the mid-eighteenth century.  
AFor the most part, judges took the word of informants at face value or initiated the warrant 
themselves on the basis of hear-say.@159  Massachusetts in this period Afined any justice of the 
peace up to fifty pounds for refusing to issue a warrant for military deserters.@160  To be sure,
colonial authorities sometimes rejected warrants.  Cuddihy reports that the New York council in 
1745 Afound >no foundation for a warrant= because the informant was Aable to Sware only to hare 
Says [hearsay].@161  Ultimately this view, Blackstone=s view, prevailed in the Fourth 
Amendment=s requirement of probable cause based on oath or affirmation.  It would please the 
Framers that magistrates today examine the warrant application and the affiant, require a showing 
of probable cause, and that magistrates have the power to refuse the warrant.  
E.  Clause [7]: warrants are required for all arrests in the home unless made in hot 
pursuit or to protect life or property. 
when the Fourth Amendment was framed@).
159
 Cuddihy, supra note 35, at 856.
160
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161
 Id. at 862 (quoting a letter from Jonathan Law to William Shirley, June 19, 1745).
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Here I follow the Court=s doctrine in Payton v. New York.162  As Payton concedes, the 
common law is less than clear that warrants were required for arrests in the home.  The most 
famous rule from the English cases is actually dictum and is less than crystal clear.163  Lord Coke 
stated the rule as forbidding an arrest unless the defendant has been indicted.  Blackstone derided 
Coke=s rule as allowing Afelons to escape without punishment@ and noted that Matthew Hale 
Acombated it with invincible authority, and strength of reason.@164  But to reject the rule that an 
indictment is required is not to reject the rule that a warrant is required.  Blackstone declared that 
the law permitted a warrant-less arrest upon hot pursuit165 and in the Aprosecution@ of a hue and 
cry.166  Matthew Hale=s rejection of Lord Coke=s rule also seems by its terms limited to hot 
pursuit,167 though as the Court notes it has not Atypically been read that way.@168  Hawkins 
devoted an entire chapter to arrest in the home and the best reading of Hawkins is that only a few 
exceptions existed to the requirement that a warrant, a capias, or some other kind of process was 
162
 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
163
 The King=s Bench in Semayne's Case, 5 Co.Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-196 
(K.B.1603), said: AIn all cases when the King is party, the Sheriff (if the doors be not open) may 
break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K.'s process, if 
otherwise he cannot enter.@  The majority thought that Aother execution of the King=s process@
implied that the Sheriff was there pursuant to a warrant.  But it is only an inference.
164
 4 W. BLACKSTONE=S COMMENTARIES * 287.
165
 Id. at * 290.
166
 Id. at * 291.
167 A[I]f the supposed offender fly and take house, and the door will not be opened upon 
demand of the constable and notification of his business, the constable may break the door, tho 




required to force entry into a structure and make an arrest.169  Other than hot pursuit, Hawkins 
notes exceptions for when a lawfully arrested person escapes and retreats to a house and when an 
Aaffray@ occurs in a house in the view or hearing of a constable.170
Thus, it seems to me that the majority is right to read the common law was that a warrant 
was required except for hot pursuit and other exigencies.  The dissent disagreed.  Both symmetry 
and policy suggests that the majority=s conclusion is better than the dissent=s.  As the Court 
requires a search warrant to search a home, however, and as an arrest is at least as great an 
invasion of one=s liberties, symmetry suggests requiring a warrant for an arrest in the home.  The 
Court said that to do otherwise would be to Adisregard the overriding respect for the sanctity of 
the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.@171  I see no 
reason to disagree with the policy implicit in the Court=s rhetoric.
F. Clause [6]: no arrests or other seizure of a person shall be made on less than 
probable cause.
169
 2 William Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 14, p. 86-87, sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 10 
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The common law was clear that individualized suspicion was needed to make an arrest.  
As early as the thirteenth century, the common law required cause to make an arrest. Bracton 
reported that the knights and others in the hue and cry Awill arrest as best they can those they 
suspect.@172  Another way to effect an arrest in Bracton=s day was on the oath of twelve knights 
that someone is Asuspected of some crime.@173  One formulation of the cause needed to arrest for 
a felony was Agood cause,@ though this could be satisfied by Athe common fame and voice.@174
Michael Dalton=s 1622 handbook for Justices of the Peace noted that every man may arrest 
another whom he knows to have committed a felony.175  Moreover, every man Amay arrest 
suspicious persons that be of ill fame@ as long as there was Asome felony committed in deed.@176
Dalton also states a requirement that the one making the arrest personally knows of the suspicion 
and that the suspicion be for a particular felony.177
By Blackstone=s day, however, the notion of Aill fame@ as a basis for suspicion had 
disappeared.  Blackstone used the term Aprobable suspicion@ at one point to describe the cause 
172
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177 AAlso the party that shall arrest such suspected person, must have a suspicion of him 
himself, and for the same felony, or otherwise suspicion generally is no cause to arrest another.@
While it is far from clear what Asuspicion of him himself@ means, a later passage permits arrest 
on the Acommon voice and same@ that the arrestee committed the felony.  Id.  If Acommon voice@
justifies an arrest, Asuspicion of him himself@ seems to mean only that the person making the 
arrest know of this Acommon voice,@ not that he personally know the facts giving rise to the 
suspicion (which is the rule today).
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that the arresting party must have178 and when describing the role of the justice of the peace in 
ascertaining whether the affiant showed sufficient cause, it is plain that rumor and reputation 
would not suffice.  
[I]t is fitting to examine upon oath the party requiring a warrant, as well to 
ascertain that there is a felony or other crime actually committed, without which 
no warrant should be granted; as also to prove the cause and probability of 
suspecting the party, against whom the warrant is prayed.179
The Continental Congress in 1774 condemned suspicion-less searches by customs and 
excise officers.180  The Framers, of course, used probable cause in the Warrant Clause.  If we 
accept that the Fourth Amendment was aimed only at general warrants, the Aseizures@ of 
Apersons@ referred to in the initial clause would be limited to seizures under general warrants of 
arrest, condemned by Blackstone as Aillegal and void for . . . uncertainty.@181  But drawing on our 
operating premise that the Framers would have written a different amendment if they could have 
178
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seen modern police methods, it is a safe inference that the Framers would have wanted to make 
the common law of arrest part of our constitutional protections.  Thus, I include the principle of 
no arrests without probable cause.
181
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But my clause is broader because it says Ano arrests or other seizure of the person shall be 
made on less than probable cause.@  This is a direct attack on Terry v. Ohio,182 where the Court 
held that a seizure and limited search could be made on less than probable cause.  It should not 
be surprising that my reconstituted Fourth Amendment has no room for Terry.  Terry, after all, 
cleanly severs the Reasonableness Clause from the Warrant Clause and seeks to find doctrinal 
implications from the Reasonable Clause.  The Court conceded, AIf this case involved police 
conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain 
whether 'probable cause' existed to justify the search and seizure which took place.@183  But, the 
Court hastened to add, Athat is not the case.@  With the Warrant Clause rendered inoperative, the 
Court was free to wander about the Reasonable Clause: Athe conduct involved in this case must 
be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.@184
The reader will not be surprised by this point that I level two criticisms at Terry.  First, 
unlike the Framing era, when Aunreasonable@ had a definite meaning, today it means what five 
members of the Court agree that it means.  It means, for example, that an anonymous tip only 
vaguely verified, and that turned out to be incorrect, can justify a stop of a vehicle.185  It means 
182
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 In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), the anonymous tip was that Vanessa 
White, possessing an ounce of cocaine, would leave a certain apartment building in a particular 
vehicle and go to Dobey=s Motel.  The officers verified that the vehicle was in front of the 
apartment building.  They saw a woman leave the building, get in the vehicle, and start driving 
toward Dobey=s Motel.  Before the driver gave any direct indication that the Doby Motel was her 
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that a tip offered by someone whose only other tip had proven to be wrong can justify ordering a 
driver out of his car.186  It means that Aunprovoked flight@ after the appearance of a police caravan 
can justify forcibly stopping an individual.187
My most fundamental criticism, though, is that the Framers would not have understood 
this amphibian event -- a seizure that is, by the Court=s own admission, not an arrest; and a search 
that is admittedly not the kind of search that can accompany an arrest.  In 1622, it was perfectly 
clear in The Countrey Justice that an arrest is the Afirst restraining of a mans person, depriving it 
of his own will and liberty; and may be called the beginning of imprisonment.@188  To Blackstone 
it was perfectly clear that Ano man is to be arrested, unless charged with such a crime, as will at 
least justify holding him to bail, when taken.@189  Moreover, it was clear to Blackstone that once 
arrested, he was a prisoner and the justice of the peace must either release him as wrongly 
arrested, give him bail, or commit him to prison.190  Even Anight walkers@ whose offense seems 
to have been to Asleep in the day time and go abroad in the nights@191 were to be arrested and held 
in custody until morning192 when they, presumably, would face an examination by the justice of 
destination, however, the officer pulled her over, obtained consent to search, and found 
marijuana in her attache case.  No ounce of cocaine was found.
186
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the peace like any other arrested person.193
In sum, the common law authorized an Aall or nothing@ interference with the liberty of 
those suspected of crimes.194  The constable, or a private citizen, could arrest someone on 
probable suspicion that he had committed a felony.  This event began the process of 
imprisonment, though the justice of the peace could discharge the arrestee if he found the charge 
to be Awholly groundless.@195  As Justice Douglas pointed out in his Terry dissent, the effect of 
the Astop-and-frisk@ regime is to permit police to seize and search in situations when magistrates 
would be forbidden to authorize an interference with liberty. AHad a warrant been sought, a 
magistrate would . . . have been unauthorized to issue one, for he can act only if there is a 
showing of >probable cause.=@196  Isn=t that an odd way to read the Fourth Amendment?  Well, it is 
if one seeks an authentic Fourth Amendment with its abhorrence of general warrants based on 
loose suspicion.  In Douglas=s somewhat purplish prose, ATo give the police greater power than a 
magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path. Perhaps such a step is desirable to 
cope with modern forms of lawlessness. But if it is taken, it should be the deliberate choice of the 
people through a constitutional amendment.@197
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G.  Clause [1]:  The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
I have assumed that Davies is correct in reading the history to render this clause merely 
the stated justification for banning general warrants.  It might seem, therefore, that this clause is 
superfluous in my reconstructed Fourth Amendment.  But its function in my account, which is 
one of its functions in the Court=s Fourth Amendment, is to define the scope of the Amendment.  
I will discuss the Court=s approach to this quite complicated question and evaluate current 
doctrine using the Fourth Amendment history I developed in Part III.
History agrees with the Court=s holding in Oliver v. United States198 that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect a marijuana field that was several hundred yards from the road 
despite the existence of a fence, a locked gate, and a ANo Trespassing Sign.@199  It probably seems 
self-evident that a field several hundred yards from a house is not a Ahouse.@   If one needs more 
evidence, consider that Madison=s original draft of the Fourth Amendment protected Atheir 
persons, their houses, their papers, and their other property.@200  The locution Aother property@
was changed to Aeffects.@  Though there is precious little legislative history on point, Aeffects@ is a 
smaller universe than Aother property.@  Indeed, the inference that Aother property@ would include 
198
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real property other than houses while Aeffects@ referred to personal property is irresistible.201
Thus, when the House Committee reported out Aeffects@ in place of Aother property,@202 one must 
assume that the Framers intended to exclude real property other than houses.
Most contemporary cases in which the Court seeks to determine the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment by finding its Aedges@ are not as easy as Oliver.  The Court initially saw the question 
as whether the authorities invaded one=s property interest in the item seized or the area searched.  
So if the authorities seized some papers from the defendant=s office, he could claim Fourth 
Amendment protection both because the papers were his and because he had a property interest 
in the office Aspace@ as well.203  A harder case was presented when an Act of Congress required a 
defendant in a forfeiture case to comply with the demand of the prosecutor to produce books, 
invoices, or other papers.204  I will return to this case shortly.
By making the Fourth Amendment depend on property interests, the Court was almost 
surely replicating the Framers= Fourth Amendment.  It is difficult to imagine Apersons, houses, 
persons, and effects@ in the minds of the Framers as anything but property concepts.  And the 
Court continued to look for property interests as the Aedges@ of the Fourth Amendment for many 
decades.  Thus, a listening device attached to the wall of an adjoining room that did not belong to 
the defendant was outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the Court held in Goldman v. 
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United States.205  A Aspike mike@ inserted into the wall from an adjoining room was, however, 
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment if it made physical contact with the defendant=s 
premises.206  But this is a pretty thin distinction.  Justice Douglas, concurring, complained about 
the Court=s reliance on the Atrivialities of local law of trespass,@ and argued that the Adepth of the 
penetration of the electronic device -- even the degree of its remoteness from the inside of the 
house -- is not the measure of the injury.  There is in each such case a search that should be 
made, if at all, only on a warrant issued by a magistrate.@207
Douglas=s legitimate concern with measuring the extent of the injury led the Court to 
abandon a property based perimeter of the Fourth Amendment.  In Katz v. United States,208 the 
Court faced a case that the parties thought called for an extension of the Aspike mike@ case.  
Federal agents put a Abug@ on a public phone booth that Katz was using to convey gambling 
information.  Thus, Katz argued that a public phone booth was a constitutionally protected space 
and urged the Court to overrule the case that found no Fourth Amendment protected against a 
listening device on the wall of an adjoining room.  The government argued that whatever the 
right disposition of Goldman, a phone booth was not a constitutionally protected space.
The Court threw both parties a curve, concluding that Aconstitutionally protected space@
and the degree of invasion of property interests were just not the right metrics for finding the 
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edges of the Fourth Amendment.  For the relatively clear, if sometimes unsatisfying, property-
based edge, the Court substituted the hopelessly vague notion of a Alegitimate@ or Areasonable@
expectation of privacy.  It held that one who has closed the door of the public phone booth and 
paid for his call has not knowingly exposed to the public the contents of the call.  Justice Harlan, 
concurring, rephrased the majority=s analysis as whether Katz had an expectation of privacy when 
he made the call and whether that expectation was a reasonable one.  Harlan=s test became the 
one the Court would use to police the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment.
While the result in Katz seems intuitively right, the Court=s vague and elastic notion of 
Areasonable expectation of privacy@ has permitted the Court to refuse Fourth Amendment 
protection to banking records, garbage placed in an opaque plastic bag and left for collection on 
one=s property, telephone numbers dialed from inside one=s home, or the inside of one=s home 
from a helicopter or low-flying plane.  These results make me wonder if Justice Black had the
right approach, if not the right result, in his Katz dissent.  Black grumpily contended that the 
Court did not need a magic formula for measuring the scope of the Fourth Amendment.  He 
argued that the Court had what it needed in the language of the Fourth Amendment protecting 
our Apersons, houses, papers, and effects.@  As he put it
While I realize that an argument based on the meaning of words lacks the scope, 
and no doubt the appeal, of broad policy discussions and philosophical discourses 
on  such nebulous subjects as privacy, for me the language of the Amendment is 
the crucial place to look in construing a written document such as our 
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Constitution.209
To substitute a Aright to privacy@ for the specific words of the Fourth Amendment, Black worried, 
would make the Court Aa continuously functioning constitutional convention.@210
209
 Id. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting).
210
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I think Black was right in his approach, both for historical and jurisprudential reasons.  
But I think Katz should have won his case on the theory that he urgedCthat the Court should hold 
that a phone booth is a constitutionally protected space.  We rent homes, apartments, and hotel 
rooms and all of them are protected by the Fourth Amendment.  When we close the door to the 
phone booth and put our dime (in the old days) into the machine, why not simply say we are 
renting the phone booth?  A phone booth is not unlike a hotel room with respect to the key 
question about what the Court called the Auninvited ear.@  One who picks up a telephone in a 
hotel room or in a pay phone booth is renting the space around the phone.  The hotel occupant is 
renting more space but why should that matter?  The hotel room is more private but that is not to 
say that the phone booth is not private.  On this view, Katz should win his argument by claiming 
that the phone booth was, in effect, his house.
If this is the right way to analyze Katz, then the pen register case, Smith v. Maryland, is 
also easily resolved, but the outcome is different from the one the Court reached.  In Smith, the 
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issue was whether the Fourth Amendment protected the telephone numbers dialed on a phone 
inside a home.  The Court consulted the information pages of the telephone book and its own 
knowledge about how the telephone business works to conclude that Smith did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed.  I have no idea whether that is the 
right application of the malleable Katz test, but I think the right question is whether activities 
carried on in private in the home are protected by the Fourth Amendment.  And I think the 
answer is yes.  So Smith was wrongly decided.
The Smith principle -- that activities carried on in private in the home are protected by the 
Fourth Amendment -- provides a much easier analytical framework to reach the same result the 
Court reached recently in Kyllo v. United States.211  The issue in Kyllo was whether the Fourth 
Amendment protected from scrutiny heat waves leaving a home.  If telephone numbers that leave 
the home are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, why would heat waves be protected?  
Indeed, between the two, it seems to me that the expectation of privacy test would be more likely 
to protect phone numbers.  Until I read Smith, I did not know that the phone company recorded 
local calls.  But I knew, because snow melts on my roof, that heat waves emanate from my 
house.  Yet in Kyllo the Court ruled that heat waves are not protected.  The majority gives the 
holding of Smith when surveying the Katz cases212 yet makes no effort to distinguish it.  The 
Kyllo dissent is surely right to observe that under Smith it would have been constitutional to put a 
listening device on the phone booth that simply measured Athe relative volume of sound leaving 
211
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the booth.@213  And if that is constitutional under Smith, it is not clear why the police cannot 
measure Athe relative amounts of heat radiating from the house.@214
In truth, Smith and Kyllo simply cannot co-exist.  Of course, given the extreme 
malleability of the Katz test, a future Court could candidly concede that Smith (or Kyllo) made 
the wrong judgment.  But how much better to have a test that doesn=t depend on the makeup of 
the Court for its application.  The Framers would have expected activities carried on in private in 
the home to be beyond the eyes of government.  Whether one is dialing phone numbers, sitting in 
a hot sauna, or growing marijuana plants (as Kyllo was), those are activities carried on in private 
in the home and are protected by the Fourth Amendment without regard to one=s expectation of 
privacy.
Other cases are far more easily resolved by my plain meaning Fourth Amendment theory 
than by the Katz test.  As noted earlier, the holding in Oliver v. United States215 that a field is not 
a house makes good sense.  It makes far better sense than the Court=s alternative rationale -- that 
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his carefully guarded marijuana 
patch.  This analytical move left the majority open to a withering critique from the dissent.  What 
is the best source of reasonable expectations of privacy involving real property? Surely it is the 
state law about trespassing.  The state law in Oliver made it a crime to do what the police did.  
Yet the majority, with a straight face, concluded that state positive law about one=s property 
213
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214
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rights did not necessarily determine whether a property owner had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  The idea is laughable.  Yet, on my reading of the Fourth Amendment history, the 
outcome in Oliver is correct.  A marijuana patch that far from the house is not a house.
In United States v. Knotts,216 federal agents installed a Abeeper@ in a can of chloroform 
that Knotts purchased.  Agents used the beeper to ascertain later that the can was sitting outside 
Knotts=s cabin.  Was this a search?  The Court held no, because all that was learned could have 
been learned by visual surveillance and thus Knotts had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the route taken to this cabin or the fact that the can was sitting in his yard.  That, it seems to me, 
is the right result but reached more easily by asking whether there was a search of Knotts=s house 
or effects?  His house was not searched because the can was in the yard.  His effects were not 
searched because nothing was learned about the inside of the can.  End of case.
What if the can had been taken inside and the agents later learned that it was still inside 
the house by listening to the beeper?  This is a search of the house because the agents are 
learning about activities occurring in the house.  The Court agreed, in United States v. Karo,217
phrasing its holding in terms of expectations of privacy.  But why bother?  Did the activity occur 
in private in a home?  If yes, the Fourth Amendment protects the area.  
216
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Other cases where my theory produces a different result include the fly-over cases (or 
hovercraft cases as I described them in my introduction).  If we ask whether one has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy against a helicopter flying in permitted airspace, the answer is probably 
unknowable.  The Court split 5-4.  If we ask a different question -- whether the interiors of our 
houses are protected by the Fourth Amendment -- the answer is easy: Ahouses@ appears in the 
Fourth Amendment.  Of course, plain meaning does not solve all the problems even with houses. 
 Surely, we could act in a way that exposes the interior of our house and thus forfeits the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment.  If we, for example, played poker in a brightly lit room 
with no curtains on our window in a jurisdiction where it is unlawful to gamble,218 it seems likely 
that the police would not violate the Fourth Amendment by looking from the sidewalk and 
noticing that money was changing hands.  So there will be difficult questions about forfeiture or 
waiver.  Yet I think these questions easier to answer than the amorphous Areasonable expectation 
of privacy@ question.  If I have a sky light in my bathroom, I think I have not forfeited the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment regardless of what my expectation might be about 
hovercrafts.  The Court disagrees, using its expectation of privacy test.219
Similarly, I think a plain meaning of Apersons, houses, papers, and effects@ makes the 
garbage case easier, too.  In applying its expectation of privacy test, the Greenwood Court made 
218
 I did this in Tennessee shortly after moving to a new, small town, where I knew almost 
no one.  It occurred to me later that this was not my brightest move but I was not arrested.
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much of the possibility that Aplastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are 
readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.@220
While this may be true enough, and may be relevant to whether the home owner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the trash container, it all seems beside the point if we 
ask whether the home owner=s trash is an Aeffect.@  Surely it is.  The next question is forfeiture.  
Has the home owner forfeited his right to the contents of the trash by placing it on his property 
for the trash collector.  While a closer question than whether the trash was his Aeffect,@ it seems 
to me that one does not forfeit the contents of the trash until the collector has reduced it to his 
possession. Imagine a homeowner who discovers something valuable missing and rushes to the 
curb where the trash collector has arrived and is about to put her hand on the garbage bag.  The 
home owner demands the trash.  Who has a property right to the trash?  This sounds a little like 
the wild fox case from the first day of property, though I guess trash is not wild, but a common 
sense solution is that my property remains my property until you have possession of it.  As long 
as it is on my property, which the trash was in Greenwood, I think I am still the owner.  This is 
another case the Court got wrong, in my view, and several states agree.
And what is the cost of saying that the Fourth Amendment protects garbage on our 
premises, the telephone numbers we dial, and the inside of our houses from helicopters?  Does it 
mean that the police cannot rummage through our garbage, record our phone numbers, or stare 
down at our houses?  No.  It simply means the police have to have a warrant in the two latter 
cases, because they involve searches of a house, and probable cause to seize and examine our 
garbage.  Is that such a draconian limitation on the police?  It is, I believe, much more in keeping 
220 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41.
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with the Fourth Amendment that the Framers created.  Of course, it was not just suspicion-less 
searches that drew expressions of concern from the anti-Federalists.  They were also worried that 
customs officials might abuse their office and obtain evidence from that abuse.  I now turn to that 
dimension of current Fourth Amendment doctrine.
H. Clause [3]: other than searches incident to arrest, no searches shall be conducted in 
any case on less than probable cause to believe that the search will produce evidence of crime
Recall Patrick Henry=s speech to the Virginia State Convention contemplating a Bill of 
Rights.  Part of Henry=s concern about a Agovernment of force@ was with the power to search.  He 
wrote, ASuppose an exciseman will demand leave to enter your cellar, or house, by virtue of his 
office; perhaps he may call on the militia to enable him to go.@221  Today=s Aexcisemen@ are the 
federal and state police charged with the war on drugs.  While the Court=s doctrine does not 
permit police to Ademand leave to enter,@222 the police have adopted a strategy of implied 
coercion that, I believe, is the twenty-first century equivalent to a demand.  
221
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Indeed, this strategy has proved so successful that it has largely replaced other 
justifications for searching a suspect (incident to arrest or in a Terry stop and frisk.).  One police 
detective said that as many as 98% of the searches he conducts are consent searches.223  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court characterized police requests for consent from motorists as a Awidespread 
abuse of our existing law that allows law enforcement officers to obtain consent searches of 
every motor vehicle stopped for even the most minor traffic violation.@224  The court cited a study 
that found 95% of motorists gave written consent to police (written consent is required in New 
Jersey).225  The Court noted that police have almost unchecked discretion in deciding what 
drivers to stop -- because it is Avirtually impossible to drive and not unwittingly commit some 
infraction of our motor vehicle code@226 -- and totally unchecked discretion in deciding which 
drivers to ask for consent.  Thus, though racial profiling is not the only problem raised by the 
Supreme Court=s consent search doctrine, the almost complete discretion it provides state 
troopers certainly makes racial profiling extremely easy to accomplish and impossible to detect.
How could a driver ever prove that the officer asked him for consent because of his race?
The New Jersey court described categories of methods for securing this Avoluntary@
consent.  One is to use Aextended detention and questioning regarding issues not related to the 
reason for the stop, such as AHow much money do you have in your pocket?" and "Why are you 
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riding around on the New Jersey Turnpike?@  A second strategy is to use Aintimidating statements 
to obtain consent to search@C, for example A the drug dog's on the way,@ and Aonce the drug dog 
gets here, everybody gets arrested.@  A third technique is to Ause >hypothetical= consent requests@
such as Aif I asked for consent to search your car, would you sign it?@227
An even more dramatic example can be seen in the facts from a recent United States 
Supreme Court case, United States v. Drayton.228  Because everything about consent is also about 
context, I quote at length from the Court=s recitation of the facts.  The bus driver
allowed three members of the Tallahassee Police Department to board the bus as 
part of a routine drug and weapons interdiction effort.   The officers were dressed 
in plain clothes and carried concealed weapons and visible badges.
227
 Id. at 911.
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Once onboard Officer Hoover knelt on the driver's seat and faced the rear 
of the bus.   He could observe the passengers and ensure the safety of the two 
other officers without blocking the aisle or otherwise obstructing the bus exit.   
Officers Lang and Blackburn went to the rear of the bus. Blackburn remained 
stationed there, facing forward.  Lang worked his way toward the front of the bus, 
speaking with individual passengers as he went.  He asked the passengers about 
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their travel plans and sought to match passengers with luggage in the overhead 
racks.  To avoid blocking the aisle, Lang stood next to or just behind each 
passenger with whom he spoke.
According to Lang's testimony, passengers who declined to cooperate with 
him or who chose to exit the bus at any time would have been allowed to do so 
without argument.   In Lang's experience, however, most people are willing to 
cooperate.   Some passengers go so far as to commend the police for their efforts 
to ensure the safety of their travel.   Lang could recall five to six instances in the 
previous year in which passengers had declined to have their luggage searched.   It 
also was common for passengers to leave the bus for a cigarette or a snack while 
the officers were on board.  Lang sometimes informed passengers of their right to 
refuse to cooperate.  On the day in question, however, he did not.
Respondents were seated next to each other on the bus.   Drayton was in 
the aisle seat, Brown in the seat next to the window.   Lang approached 
respondents from the rear and leaned over Drayton's shoulder.  He held up his 
badge long enough for respondents to identify him as a police officer.  With his 
face 12- to-18 inches away from Drayton's, Lang spoke in a voice just loud 
enough for respondents to hear:
AI'm Investigator Lang with the Tallahassee Police Department.   We're 
conducting bus interdiction [sic], attempting to deter drugs and illegal weapons 
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being transported on the bus.  Do you have any bags on the bus?@
Both respondents pointed to a single green bag in the overhead luggage 
rack.  Lang asked, "Do you mind if I check it?," and Brown responded, " Go 
ahead."  Lang handed the bag to Officer Blackburn to check.   The bag contained 
no contraband.
Officer Lang noticed that both respondents were wearing heavy jackets 
and baggy pants despite the warm weather.  In Lang's experience drug traffickers 
often use baggy clothing to conceal weapons or narcotics.   The officer thus asked 
Brown if he had any weapons or drugs in his possession.  And he asked Brown:  
"Do you mind if I check your person?"  Brown answered, "Sure," and cooperated 
by leaning up in his seat, pulling a cell phone out of his pocket, and opening up 
his jacket. Lang reached across Drayton and patted down Brown's jacket and 
pockets, including his waist area, sides, and upper thighs.   In both thigh areas, 
Lang detected hard objects similar to drug packages detected on other occasions.   
Lang arrested and handcuffed Brown. Officer Hoover escorted Brown from the 
bus.
Lang then asked Drayton, "Mind if I check you?"  Drayton responded by 
lifting his hands about eight inches from his legs.  Lang conducted a pat-down of 
Drayton's thighs and detected hard objects similar to those found on Brown.   He 
arrested Drayton and escorted him from the bus.   A further search revealed that 
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respondents had duct-taped plastic bundles of powder cocaine between several 
pairs of their boxer shorts.   Brown possessed three bundles containing 483 grams 
of cocaine.   Drayton possessed two bundles containing 295 grams of cocaine.229
Brown and Drayton were charged with possession of cocaine and possession with intent 
to distribute.  The district court judge refused to grant their motion to suppress, finding it 
"obvious that [respondents] can get up and leave, as can the people ahead of them." The judge 
then concluded: A[E]verything that took place between Officer Lang and Mr. Drayton and Mr. 
Brown suggests that it was cooperative. There was nothing coercive, there was nothing 
confrontational about it."230
Nothing coercive?  To be sure, Officer Lang made no explicit Ademand@ that Brown and 
Drayton permit him to search their persons yet the aroma of coercion is unmistakable.  One 
officer stood in the front of the bus.  Another officer stood in the rear of the bus.  A third officer 
began working his way from the back of the bus to the front.  Though the officers testified that 
anyone seeking to leave the bus could do so, on this day no one left the bus.  If you were sitting 
in that bus, under police observation from front and rear, would you think you could simply get 
up and leave the bus?  I doubt it.  Moreover, though Lang sometimes informed passengers of 
their right to refuse consent, he did not inform anyone on that particular day.  Trapped on the bus, 
with no idea that they could refuse consent, did Brown and Drayton experience a Ademand@ that 
they permit the search.  It seems to me that what Officer Lang did was no different from the 
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exciseman=s feared Ademand . . . to enter your cellar, or house, by virtue of his office.@231  Henry 
feared that the exciseman might Acall on the militia to enable him to go@ where he pleased.  In 
Henry=s day, the exciseman was not armed.  Today, of course, the state and federal police are 
heavily armed.  When seeking to interdict the flow of contraband, today=s police are a 
combination of exciseman and militia man.
231
 Elliot, supra note 54, at 412 (Patrick Henry addressing Virginia Convention, June 15, 
1788).
While one can obviously never know, I am confident that if we described the facts of the 
search of Brown and Drayton to Patrick Henry, and described the purpose of the bus interdiction 
and the arms carried by police, Henry would exclaim that his worst fears had been realized.  
Most citizens today probably view Officer Lang=s bus interdiction more favorably than the anti-
Federalists viewed the exciseman=s search for dutiable items.  It is this evolution of middle 
America toward fear of crime and criminals and away from fear of government that has 
contributed to a steady erosion of the Fourth Amendment.  But it is the role of the Fourth 
Amendment (indeed most of the Bill of Rights) to restrain popular government behavior when it 
intrudes too far into the core rights created by the Framers.  One example is the Court=s 
willingness to impose what it perceived as the Framer=s Awall of separation@ between church and 
state even though prayer in school and various forms of public aid to parochial schools were 
quite popular.
I suppose it is more difficult to work up enthusiasm to protect those who are carrying 
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almost 800 grams (27 ounces) of cocaine.  After all, atheists may challenge our belief structure 
but drug dealers threaten us and our children with addiction and death.  Yet I cannot resist the 
conclusion that the Aconsent@ of Brown and Drayton is consent only in the most academic sense.  
Did Lang employ explicit coercion?  No.  If that is the test of consent, and from the Court=s 
opinion that is roughly what it amounts to, then Brown and Drayton should lose.  But isn=t that a 
pretty impoverished view of consent when one is facing armed police who appear to be blocking 
egress from a bus?  Given what we are learning about the reaction of citizens to authority, 
leaving aside authorities who happen to carry guns and have the power to arrest, a definition of 
consent that includes every non-coerced act seems unrealistic.
And the New Jersey Supreme Court agrees, holding in State v. Carty232 that in some 
situations, true consent is simply not possible.  The court concluded that even a signed, written 
consent, as the state court had earlier required in State v. Johnson,233 might not be Avoluntary or 
otherwise reasonable@ when the state police seek that consent from a motorist who has been 
stopped on the highway. 
232
 790 A.2d 903 (N.J. 2002).
233
 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975).
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What can be synthesized from a review of scholarly articles, cases from around 
the country, and the empirical data referred to in this opinion, is that despite use of 
the first-tell-then-ask rule or the voluntary and knowing standard adopted in 
Johnson, consent searches following valid motor vehicle stops are either not 
voluntary because people feel compelled to consent for various reasons, or are not 
reasonable because of the detention associated with obtaining and executing the 
consent search.   Stated differently, hindsight has taught us that the Johnson
standard has not been effective in protecting our citizens' interest against 
unreasonable intrusions when it comes to suspicionless consent searches 
following valid motor vehicle stops.234
The state court then held that a request for consent in the absence of a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion235 violated the state=s version of the Fourth Amendment.236  I have 
elsewhere questioned whether the New Jersey Supreme Court goes far enough to solve the 
problem of Aconsent@ that is implicitly coerced by the situation in which the suspect finds 
himself.237  That question is not germane to this paper.  Here, I argue that Aconsent@ defined as 
the absence of explicit coercion is an inappropriate way of determining when the Aexcisemen@
234 Carty, 790 A.2d at 911.
235
 This is the standard from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
236 Carty, 790 A.2d at 911-12.
237
 See George C. Thomas III, Terrorism, Race, and a New Approach to Consent 
Searches, ___ Miss. L.J. ___ (2003).
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have effectively made a Ademand . . . to enter your cellar, or house, by virtue of his office.@238
State v. Carty is more than ample support for my argument.  I have no doubt that if Patrick Henry 
viewed even the run of the mill request for consent made by armed officers who have detained a 
person on the side of the road, he would conclude that the Arequest@ was a Ademand@ made Aby 
virtue of his office@ -- that is, by virtue of the power the officer has to detain the motorist until he 
is satisfied that no Adutiable items@ (contraband) are being Asmuggled@ (transported) in the 
vehicle.
V.  The Court=s Competing Fourth Amendment Vision
The Court has tried two approaches to Fourth Amendment interpretation and is currently 
shifting to a third.  Neither of the first two proved successful and the third is probably the worst 
of all.  The first approach, seen in Boyd v. United States239 and Gouled v. United States,240 had 
the Court privileging the privacy of books, records, and other papers.  In Boyd, the Court struck 
down an Act of Congress that permitted a United States attorney in forfeiture cases to make a 
motion requiring the defendant to produce any Abook, invoice, or paper@ that supported the 
government=s allegations.241  At that point, the defendant had a choice between producing the 
Abook, invoice, or paper@ or having his failure to produce be taken as a confession of the 
238
 Elliot, supra note 54, at 412 (Patrick Henry addressing Virginia Convention, June 15, 
1788).
239
 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
240
 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
241
 116 U.S. at 620.
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allegation in the motion.  The Court made much of the privacy associated with personal papers, 
first quoting from the famous English case of Entick v. Carrington242:
 Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest property, and are 
so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection; and 
though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass, yet where 
private papers are removed and carried away the secret nature of those goods will 
be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that 
respect.@243
Then the Court tried its hand at ringing phrases in praise of the privacy of personal 
papers:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that 
constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible 
right of personal security, personal liberty. and private property . . . .  Breaking 
into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but 
any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony, or of his private 
papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his goods, is 
within the condemnation of that judgment [in Entick v. Carrington].244
242
 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C. P. 1765).
243
 116 U.S. at 627-28 (quoting from Entick v. Carrington).
244
 Id. at 630.
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In Gouled, papers were taken from the defendant’s office under the authority of two 
search warrants.  Despite the authorization given the officers in the search warrants, the Court 
held that the papers were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  The problem the Court 
saw was that Gouled’s interest in his private papers was greater than the government’s interest.  
Thus no authorization could justify seizure of the papers.  Here is the way the Court put it:
Although search warrants have . . . been used in many cases ever since the 
adoption of the Constitution, and although their use has been extended from time 
to time to meet new cases within the old rules, nevertheless it is clear that, at 
common law and as the result of the Boyd and Weeks Cases, they may not be used 
as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely for the 
purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal 
or penal proceeding, but that they may be resorted to only when a primary right to 
such search and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the 
complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the 
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders possession 
of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken.245
That extremely deferential approach to searches and seizures of private papers would not 
last.  In its place, the Court groped its way toward a Fourth Amendment in which warrants would 
play a critical role.  We have already seen that the Court is committed to a warrant requirement 
for searches of a home, albeit one in which consent can replace a warrant.  But what about 
245
 255 U.S. at 309.
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outside the home?  Coolidge v. New Hampshire246 sought to provide guidance.   The issue in 
Coolidge was whether a warrant was necessary to conduct a series of searches of the defendant=s 
car, seized from the driveway of his home after his arrest.  What comes pretty clearly out of 
Coolidge is that a search warrant is needed for the search of a home.247  What gave the Court 
trouble, and was joined only at the highest level of generality by Justice Harlan as the fifth 
vote,248 was whether a Awarrant requirement@ exists outside the home.  The notion is that the 
Fourth Amendment implicitly creates a preference for warrants and the State must show a 
compelling reason to dispense with this preference.  This idea began tentatively to develop in the 
1940s249 and is still occasionally spouted as dictum but plays no real role in shaping doctrine.  
Whether the Court=s mid-century warrant requirement was defensible as a matter of the 
construction or history of the Amendment, even Justice Scalia agrees that Ait is of course 
textually possible to consider [a warrant requirement] implicit within the requirement of 
reasonableness.@250  But the warrant requirement was already splintering by the time we get to 
Coolidge.  The key parts of Coolidge seeking to clarify twenty years or so of labor in the Fourth 
246
 403 U.S. 445 (1971).  Another example is Chadwick v. United States, 433 U.S. 1 
(1977), where seven members of the Court joined Chief Justice Burger=s opinion requiring a 
warrant to open a footlocker.  Though Chadwick manifested more consensus than Coolidge, the 
opinion in Coolidge is a much grander attempt to state a general principle about search warrants.
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 Id. at 474.
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 403 U.S. at 491 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.).
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 For a good explanation of the Awarrant requirement@ as well as the contrasting way to 
read the Fourth Amendment, now favored by the Court, see Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of 
the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 925, 927-929 (1997).
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 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
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Amendment vineyard were endorsed by only four justices.251   Today, it makes nonsense of the 
word Arequirement@ to argue that a warrant requirement exists outside the home.  Coolidge has 
been overruled, albeit implicitly,252 and there is no longer any meaningful presumption against 
warrant-less searches conducted outside the home.
So the road went from the Boyd-Gouled fetishism of private papers to the Coolidge
warrant requirement and then moved into the autobahn of reasonableness.  Today the Court sees 
the two clauses as separate, again outside the home, and the question of whether a search is 
251
 Justice Harlan, who provided the critical fifth vote for reversing Coolidge=s conviction, 
did not join any of the parts of the Court=s opinion specifically rejecting the State=s arguments 
that a warrant was unnecessary.  He did join, Aalthough not without difficulty,@a lengthy and 
general statement of Fourth Amendment principles that expressed a strong preference for a 
search warrant.  403 U.S. at 491 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.).
252
 I suppose California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) is technically distinguishable but 
I believe it effectively overrules Coolidge.  The Court in Carney held that a search of a motor 
home that Carney was using as a home did not require a warrant.  It was parked on public 
property, to be sure, and in that way is distinguishable from Coolidge because his car was in his 
driveway.  But Carney was using his vehicle as a home and if that does not require a search 
warrant it is difficult to know why a car that is used as a car requires a warrant.  Assuming the 
driveway is not part of the curtilage, it falls into the open fields doctrine, see supra notes 
accompanying notes 198-99, and thus is no more private than a public street.
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reasonable is a free-standing inquiry that has nothing to do with whether police should have 
gotten a warrant. 
If there is no preference for a warrant outside the home, what values guide the Court=s 
analysis?  The answer is that the Court has identified no values.  It occasionally lurches in the 
direction of relying on history, usually indulging a simplistic reading.  Beyond that, the Court is 
developing a common law of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.  The best example of this 
common law returns us to Terry v. Ohio.  The Framers would have understood, if not approved, 
the notion that an officer can stop a nightwalker to inquire into his business.  And the Court did 
require Areasonable suspicion@ to make a forcible stop.  But it also permitted a thorough frisk of 
the person based on the same standard, This would have baffled the Framers.  As we have seen 
Justice Douglas was also baffled that the Court permitted the police to do on the street, in the 
interest of fighting crime, what a justice of the peace could not authorize by warrant.
For my purpose, the significance of Terry is that it embraced a free-standing rule of 
reasonableness.  Here is the Warren Court=s explanation, written by Chief Justice Warren:
If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether 'probable cause' existed to 
justify the search and seizure which took place. However, that is not the case. We 
do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain 
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, 
or that in most instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only 
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be excused by exigent circumstances. But we deal here with an entire rubric of 
police conduct -- necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot 
observations of the officer on the beat -- which historically has not been, and as a 
practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the 
conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general 
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.
So at least when it is not practicable to get a warrant, Terry abandons the warrant and probable 
cause requirements and substitutes a free-standing test of reasonableness.  
In a thoughtful concurring opinion in Minnesota v. Dickerson,253 Justice Scalia examined 
the Framing era history and concluded that the stop of a suspicious person Aaccords with the 
common law -- that it had long been considered reasonable to detain suspicious persons for the 
purpose of demanding that they give an account of themselves.  This is suggested, in particular, 
by the so-called night-walker statutes, and their common-law antecedents.@254  But he found no 
Aprecedent for a physical search of a person thus temporarily detained for questioning.@255 As 
Scalia reads the history (and as I read the history) a search, even a frisk, of a suspicious person on 
the street requires probable cause.
253
 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
254
 Id. at 380 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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255
 Id. at 381.
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The common law gave constables, night watchmen, and probably private persons256  the 
right to arrest a suspicious night-walker, though the authorities are less than clear about what 
happened next.  Both Hale and Hawkins refer to these detentions of suspicious night-walkers as 
Aarrests.@  So do East,257 Blackstone,258 and Michael Dalton=s Countrey Justice.259  East says that
the suspicious person may be detained until he give a good account of himself.260  Blackstone 
and Hale say that the suspicious person shall be held in custody until the morning.261  What 
happens next is not stated.  
Hawkins says that a private party may arrest a night-walker Atill he make it appear, that he 
is a Person of good Reputation.@ But in a later section, he notes that the night watch shall arrest 
strangers until morning.  AAnd if no Suspicion be found, he shall go quit; and if they find Cause 
256
 Hawkins says Ait is holden by some@ that private parties can arrest a night-walker. 2 
William Hawkins, A  TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 77, sect. 20 (2d ed. 1724-26).  Hale 
mentions only the right of the constable and the night watchman to arrest Asuspicious night-
walkers,@ 2 Matthew Hale, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 89 (1847 ed.).  The distinction 
between private parties generally and the night watch was probably insignificant in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Moreover, it is entirely beside the point for my project 
because the Court=s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is premised on the notion of official 
interventions in the liberty of suspects.
257
 See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 380 (quoting 1 E. East, Pleas of the Crown ch. 5, '  70, p. 
303 (1803) ("It is said . . . that every private person may by the common law arrest any suspicious 
night-walker, and detain him till he give a good account of himself").
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 See 4 W. BLACKSTONE=S COMMENTARIES * 289; 2 Hale, supra note 256, at 98.  Terry
permits less than the common law allowed in terms of detention because the length of the Terry
stop must be measured in minutes rather than hours to be constitutional.
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of Suspicion, they shall forthwith deliver him to the Sheriff.@262  As the authorities agree that 
private persons can have no greater authority to arrest than constables and the night-watch, arrest 
until morning seems to be Hawkin=s statement of the rule as well.
Dalton does not state what happens after arrest, but he mentions arrest of night-walkers 
only on a warrant issued by a justice of the peace.263   All the authorities thus treat the detention 
of a night-walker as an arrest -- like all other warrant-less arrests based on suspicion rather than 
on an observation of a crime taking place.  The failure of the authorities to distinguish the 
detention of the night-walker from any other arrest suggests that Scalia is wrong to read the 
common law as permitting a temporary detention of nightwalkers until they gave a good account 
of their activities to the constable or the night watch.  Instead, the most natural way to read the 
history is that night-walkers would appear before the justice of the peace the next morning, just 
like someone arrested on a warrant or by virtue of the hue and cry.
Support for this reading can be found by comparing the standards required for arrest for 
felony not committed in the officer=s presence and for the arrest of the night-walker.  As we saw 
earlier, the Agood cause@ the common law required for felony arrests could be satisfied  by Athe 
common fame and voice.@264  Moreover, Hale, Blackstone, and Hawkins fail to distinguish 
between the standard required for an arrest of a night-walker and for the arrest of anyone who has 
262
 Hawkins, supra note 124, at 80. sect. 6.
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 Dalton, supra note 170, at 76.
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 Sir Anthony Ashley=s Case, 12 Coke 90, 92, 77 Eng. Rep. 1366, 1368 (1611).  See 
also 2 Hale=s Pleas of the Crown 80 (1736).
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not committed an offense in the officer=s presence.  Indeed, the common law seemed to require a 
pretty high quantum of suspicion to justify the arrest of a night-walker.  A 1709 case involved a 
woman Ataken up@ by a constable for walking the street Aupon suspicion, as being a woman of ill 
fame.@265  Chief Justice Holt held that it was Anot lawful even for a legal constable to take up a 
woman upon bare suspicion only, having been guilty of no breach of the peace nor any unlawful 
act.@
265
 2 Hale, supra note 256, at 89 n.f. (referring to Queen v. Tooley, Mich. 1709).
As I read the history, the arrests of nightwalkers were not treated any differently than 
arrests for other offenses not committed in the officer=s presence.  Thus, Terry is flawed all the 
way down.  Its authorization of a seizure on less than a magistrate would require for an arrest 
warrant is as historically flawed as its authorization of a search on less than probable cause. 
And where are we today?  The Areasonableness@ test that dispenses with a warrant and 
probable cause has expanded to the every-day situations that I sketched in Part I.  The reader is 
encouraged to re-read that Part.  The Framers would not be pleased.
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The glue holding together my proposal to revamp the Fourth Amendment is the notion 
that all seizures and all searches save the search incident to arrest must be based on probable 
cause (and the search incident to arrest will almost always in fact be justified by probable cause 
to search that runs parallel to the probable cause to arrest).  The Court has far too often dispensed 
with the requirement of probable cause. I think the Framers would have looked askance at any 
doctrine that permitted the police (the excisemen and the militia) to search without having 
Areason to suspect.@ We saw that the First Congress, acting prior to the writing and ratification of 
the Fourth Amendment, permitted searches of ships for dutiable items only when the customs 
officials had Areason to suspect any goods or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed.@266
Searches of dwelling houses, stores, buildings, and Aother such place[s]@ required Acause to 
suspect a concealment@ of dutiable items. 
266
 1 Stat., ch.5, sect. 24 (1789).
To reject Terry is to reaffirm the Framers= view requiring probable cause.  If a constable 
required more than Abare suspicion@ to arrest a night-walker in 1709 in England, we should 
require more than Areasonable suspicion@ today.  Moreover, if I read the history correctly that an 
arrest of a night-walker was treated no differently than any other arrest on suspicion, whatever 
cause is required for an arrest should be required for any Aseizure@ of the person.  The Court uses 
Aprobable cause@ as the minimum required for an arrest.  This makes good sense because the 
Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for search and arrest warrants.  The principle here is 
that probable cause is required for government to perform a Fourth Amendment search or 
seizure.  It=s simple.  It=s profound.  It=s what the Framers would have wanted. 
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In support of my rejection of Terry, I enlist Justice Scalia.  As noted a moment ago, Scalia 
has questioned whether Terry was an appropriate interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when 
it authorized a frisk of a suspect in search of weapons or evidence of a crime.  He wrote: AI 
frankly doubt, moreover, whether the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment 
would have allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and 
dangerous, to such indignity . . . .”
Terry is not the only casualty of the probable cause principle.  In United States v. 
Martinez- Fuerte,267 the Court approved permanent checkpoints near the border that monitor for 
illegal aliens by stopping cars with no suspicion at all.  In Michigan Department of State Police 
v. Sitz,268 the Court approved movable roadblocks to search for drunk drivers.  These roadblock 
cases cannot coexist with the historic probable cause principle.  Here, I can enlist the help of the 
only other justice on the current Court who takes history seriously: Justice Thomas.  He has 
raised the possibility of revisiting and overruling the roadblock cases.  In Indianapolis v. 
Edmond,269 Thomas concluded that the roadblock cases permit a narcotics roadblock.  But he 
offered the following tantalizing observation: 
I am not convinced that Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte were correctly decided.   Indeed,
I rather doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered 
267
 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
268
 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
269
 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
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Areasonable@ a program of indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of 
wrongdoing. Respondents did not, however, advocate the overruling of Sitz and 
Martinez-Fuerte, and I am reluctant to consider such a step without the benefit of 
briefing and argument.270
I think Thomas is right.  The Framers would not have recognized routine stops based on no 
suspicion at all.
270
 Id. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
But not every kind of regulatory inspection would fall in my reconstructed Fourth 
Amendment.  To reject Terry and Michigan v. Sitz is not to reject the notion that health inspectors 
have a right to enter our homes.  I would resurrect Frank v. Maryland.  Indeed,  I would adopt the 
first half of the Frank Court=s rationale as a principle for limiting the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment generally.  If the purpose of the government conduct is something other than 
uncovering evidence of crime, the Fourth Amendment simply does not provide protection.  To the 
extent this is inconsistent with the history in England of protecting printers who were accused of 
libel, the First Amendment provides that kind of protection today.  There is no reason to duplicate 
that protection in the Fourth Amendment.
I admit that deciding what is a “crime” is far from easy.  Moreover, determining the 
“purpose” of schemes that in fact produce evidence of crime is both philosophically and 
pragmatically difficult.  The Court has recently tried this on for size in Ferguson v. City of 
96
Charleston, over the protest of Justice Kennedy who denied that it is a useful distinction.   I will 
return to Ferguson shortly.  Despite the difficulty of both dimensions of the Frank principle, I 
think some rough distinctions can be drawn.
Checking train engineers for evidence of drugs in their system strikes me as not included 
within the Frank universe of Fourth Amendment events.  Same with school athletes.  The purpose 
is not to prosecute those identified but to ensure the safety of the trains and to limit drug use in 
schools.  Using checkpoints to determine if drivers have a license and registration falls outside of 
both dimensions of Frank.  The point is not to prosecute drivers who fail to have the right papers 
but to ensure the safety of the roads.  Moreover, driving without a license or vehicle registration 
does not seem like a Acrime@ to me.  One metric to separate Acrime@ from other offenses against 
the public order is the existence of a sanction that includes jail time.  The Court has already used 
this metric to identify a criminal prosecution for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.  Using the 
authorized incarceration metric, even drunk driving would not constitute a crime if the State chose 
not to authorize jail time as a sanction.  In those states, if any still exist, drunk driving roadblocks 
would be constitutional under my reconstructed Fourth Amendment.
The reader might react that the Fourth Amendment should not vary from state to state 
depending on authorized sanctions.  Perhaps.  But I think the experience of having one=s liberty 
curtailed by a roadblock where the worst that can happen is a traffic fine is substantially different 
from facing a roadblock with jail time as one of the possible outcomes.  One experience is similar 
to facing a health and safety code inspection.  The other is similar to the roadblock where the 
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police are looking for narcotics.271  The Court held the narcotics roadblock unconstitutional, 
distinguishing the drunk driving roadblock case on the ground that it, but not the narcotics 
roadblock, was designed to improve highway safety.  That is true enough but if one adopts the 
Frank principle, one need not rely on highway safety.  Instead, a court could simply say that the 
police were not searching for evidence of a crime.  The Franks principle suggests that the Court 
was wrong, and Justice Rehnquist right, in Delaware v. Prouse.272  When police pull a car over to 
check for license and registration, they are not searching for evidence of a crime.
Of course there will be close cases.  Would my reconstructed Fourth Amendment permit 
police to inventory the contents of automobiles lawfully impounded?  The Court approved these 
inspections in South Dakota v. Opperman,273 crediting the non-search rationales offered by the 
State: to protect the valuables of the car=s owner, to protect the police from trumped-up lawsuits, 
and to protect against potential danger to police from items in the car.  Those have always seemed 
like make-weight arguments to me, particularly the latter two.  But if one accepts that the 
inventory is not a search, then if falls outside the Frank principle that I have been developing.
Another close case is Ferguson, where the Court employed something like my Frank
principle to decide whether the state conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.  Simplifying 
somewhat, Charleston had a policy seeking to identify pregnant women who were using cocaine.  
Once identified through a blood test, the mothers were given the choice of a drug treatment 
271
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program or prosecution for drug use.  Deciding that whatever the ultimate goal, the immediate 
objective (sometimes called the Aprimary purpose@) was to Agenerate evidence for law enforcement 
purposes,@ the Court held that the procedure implicated and violated the Fourth Amendment.274
Although I agree with Justice Kennedy that making the determination of which purpose is 
Aprimary@ pretty much depends on who is doing the determining, the Court=s solution makes 
sense.
Close cases are not unique to my Fourth Amendment.  There are plenty of close cases in 
the Court=s doctrine and no overarching principles by which to decide close cases.  Indeed, when 
you consider that the modern Court has made it Aopen season@ on the air space above our homes, 
our banking records, the phone numbers we dial, and our use of the highways and busesCall 
without any suspicion of criminal wrongdoing whatsoever275 -- I think the modern Court has 
failed the test of history.  I hope my reconstructed Fourth Amendment gets at least a C in history.
VI. A ADo-Over@ Fourth Amendment Doctrine
As noted earlier, I think the Court=s requirement of warrants to search homes is consistent 
with the Framers= values.  Beyond that, I used the Framers= values to test two aspects of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine that seem particularly wrong-headed to me: first, the narrowing of the scope 
274
 If it implicated the Fourth Amendment, it necessarily violated the Fourth Amendment 
because a search of bodily fluids requires either an exigency or a warrant.
275
 Stopping of a vehicle requires probable cause to suspect a motor vehicle violation but 
no suspicion of a criminal violation.  And as the New Jersey Supreme Court noted, Ait is virtually 
impossible to drive and not unwittingly commit some infraction of our motor vehicle code.@
Carty, 790 A.2d at 908.
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of the Fourth Amendment by reference to expectations of privacy; and, second, the Court=s refusal 
to require particularized suspicion in many cases.
As to the first test, I concluded (here I have lots of company)276 that the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test is a failure.  It is too malleable and in the hands of a law and order 
Court has produced results difficult to comprehend, or at least I think they would be difficult for 
Patrick Henry and the First Congress to comprehend.  In its place, I would go back to the text of 
the Fourth Amendment, like Justice Black, and ask whether the police searched the person, house, 
paper, or effect of the defendant.  Even my garbage is my effect and no amount of Katzian 
analysis can persuade me otherwise.  Again to claim that the Fourth Amendment protects my 
garbage is merely to require the police to have probable cause to seize and search it.
276
 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in 
Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at AUnderstandings Recognized and Permitted by 
Society,@ 42 Duke L.J. 727 (1993).
The second radical change that follows from my historical thought experiment is to require 
probable cause for all seizures and for all searches for evidence of crime, except searches incident 
to arrest.  All the many exceptions to the Fourth Amendment that do away with probable cause 
should be abolished as long as the government conduct in question entails searching for evidence 
of a crime.  Some examples include the Terry stop-and-frisk regime, the permanent checkpoints 
near the Mexican border, and the movable drunk driving checkpoints.  If we limit the Fourth 
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Amendment to searches for evidence of crime, as the Court once did in Frank v. Maryland, many 
of the regulatory Fourth Amendment Aexceptions@ would not be included in the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Thus, government could continue to conduct health and safety inspections of 
homes, and vehicle registration checks by roadblock or by stopping cars at random.
What history suggests, and what I have attempted to craft into doctrine, is to give more 
Fourth Amendment protection against searches for evidence of crime while withdrawing Fourth 
Amendment protection entirely from regulatory schemes that are not intended to produce evidence 
of crime.  As a policy matter, I think it makes good sense to trade protection against regulatory 
schemes for a more protective Fourth Amendment when police seek evidence of crime.  The 
Warren Court, in my judgment, made a huge historical and policy mistake that later Courts have 
simply made worse.  It assumed that the Fourth Amendment was a general protection of privacy 
and thus shielded us from regulation as well as from investigation of crime.  This mistake has 
warped Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
 The sturdy principle that all searches require probable cause leads naturally to the 
abolition of consent as a free-standing justification for a search.  Here the history is less clear but 
is at least consistent with my position.  We see nothing in the pre-Framing history about consent 
searches because the proud Americans and Brits of that era would not have understood the notion 
that they should surrender their property or privacy to a lowly constable.  What we do see in the 
history of search and seizure is that individual suspicion was required before a search could 
proceed.  With that principle firmly in place, consent searches cannot pass muster.  It is really a 
simple idea.  If police have probable cause to search, they can search, without a warrant outside of 
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structures.  If police do not have probable cause to search, they cannot search.
Recall the Framers= hostility toward the hated excisemen and militia.  We have seen 
Patrick Henry=s concern that Aexciseman will demand leave to enter your cellar, or house, by 
virtue of his office; perhaps he may call on the militia to enable him to go.@277  An unnamed anti-
Federalist went further, calling excisemen the Ascruf [sic] and refuse@ of mankind who would not 
hesitate to search the petticoats of women.278  Mercy Otis Warren, the sister of James Otis, wrote 
a pamphlet condemning general searches as a Adetestable instrument of arbitrary power@ and 
Ainvited capricious house searches by insolent officers of the new central government.@ 279
Another anti-Federalist warned of Athe insolence of office@ and Adaring brutality@ of the publican, 
Aperhaps offered to the wife of thy bosom.@280 AA Son of Liberty@ worried that Aour bed-
chambers@ would be Asearched by the brutal tool of power@ when the excisemen went about their 
business.281  We need to strengthen the Fourth Amendment when the police are doing today what 
the excisemen and militia did during the pre-framing era. 
I have no illusion that any court will read this article and adopt my reconstructed Fourth 
Amendment.  My hope, instead, is to stimulate a discussion among scholars and judges about 
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better ways of understanding the Aright of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects.@
